

A remonstrance of His Sacred Royal Majesty of Sweden, unfolding the grounds and causes whereby His said Majesty was constrained to continue the war brought on by the king and Kingdom of Denmark, after the peace was ratified at Roskild, but neither pursu'd nor duly observ'd by the Danes Anno 1658.

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HIS MAJESTY OF SWEDENS Remonfrance, Declaring the Reafons that forc'd him to continue the WAR with DENMARK after the Treaty at *Roskild*.

T

Here are principally two things which cannot but affect any man

with wonder, that fhall without partiality weigh and obferve the courfe and carriage of this War betwixt the Swedes and Danes, to wit, the fingular moderation, which his Sacred Royal Majefty of *Sweden* to his Princely Renown, hath expreffed and approved to the World: and on the other fide, the extreme Ingratitude, whereby the Nation of *Denmark* hath defervedly contracted a foul and lafting infamy.

For when the moft Serene his Majefty of *Sweden*,

*The Danifh
practices a-
gainft
Sweden.*

was by mature and weighty Reafons drawn forth to a War againft *Poland*, and that he fail'd not of fuch fuccefs as ufually accompany juft undertakings, the Danes grew ftreightwayes maliciously

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affected to our Victories, deeming our Acquits to be their lofs and detriment: nor could they contain or forbear to publifh thefe envious Paffions, but they muft be practifing with the States of *Holland* to give fome check to the progrefs of the Swede in *Pruffia*;

*with
Holland,*

at leaft they readily granted a free paffage to the States Fleet through the Sound, contrary to their Faith given to us, and alfo joyn'd with them as many of their own men of War as they had in readinefs, and that to no other purpofe, but onely to fecond the crofs and finifter Defigns of the Dantzickers,

*with the
Dantzickers,*

and to heighten and embitter the Pole againft the Swede.

And though this might have ferv'd for a fufficient testimony of their meaning to us, yet they held it too fcant, unlefs they had alfo urg'd the Mufcovite to make a War on the Swedes,

*and with the
Mufcovites.*

propounding the goodliest Chriftian Provinces as a booty, to the exquisite Cruelties of barbarous Nations. Nor was the Play acted under a mask, as by men afham'd to own their parts, but they fent a pompous Embaffy to congratulate the coming of the Mufcovite into *Liefland*; folemnly exhorting him conftantly to ftick to, and effectually to profecute fo worthy a Defign.

His moft Serene Majefty of *Sweden* having been duly regardful to that Amity,

*The Swedifh
dealing with
the Dane to
prevent a
breach.*

which his Neighborhood and Confederacy with the Danes required, to prevent any perverfe opinion that might be raifed on his preparation for War, had in due feafon directed his Refident in the Danifh Court to unfold his Majefties purpofe, and for what reafons he was constrain'd to take up Arms againft the Poles.

Which Reafons appear'd fo fufficient and juft to the Danifh King,

*He
acquaints
him with his
enterprize a-
gainft
Poland, and
propofeth a
Treaty for
the
Confirmation
of ancient
Leagues by
his Refident
as
Plenipotencia-
ry,*

that he profefs'd never to impede or thwart his Defign, but rather he feem'd to wifh the Expedition prosperous.

And for as much as it feem'd for the behoof of thefe Northern Kingdoms to joyn in a ftraiter bond of Friendfhip, his Majefty hath on his part neglected

nothing that might conduce to the effecting and establishing thereof: which seem'd also fully prepar'd and ripe, when the Danes purposing nothing less than the confirmation of it, objected certain Grievances first to be removed. Which, when the Swedish Plenipotentiary suspecting

nothing, desired them to propound:

*Which the
Dane discap-
points,*

after many delays they retrieve their old complaints of Injuries committed by the Subjects of *Sweden* to the prejudice of their Customs of the Sound. But when he had easily demonstrated the groundless vanity of this, and what else was alledg'd, the Danes could no longer hold, but laying aside the vizor, plainly urg'd to be discharged of the Covenants made at *Bromsebroe*.

*by
endeavour-
ing to make
void the
treaty
Bromsebroe.*

The Swedish Commissioner after so many fruitless Demonstrations and Protestations being tyr'd with their juggling, and perceiving that the Danes had precluded all means of confirming the League,

*Whereupon
the Swedish
Resident re-
tires.*

took his leave of the King and most of the Peers of the Kingdom, and departed, referring the Debate of those pretended Grievances to a meeting of the Senators of both Kingdoms, then shortly to be held on the Borders, according to the custom of those Northern People.

He was scarce departed *Copenhagen*,

*The Danes
seize upon
Swedish
ships.*

when three Swedish ships coming from *Portugal* were detain'd, and made prize by the Danes in the Sound; and presently after the Inhabitants of

Breme and *Pomerania* are follicited to renounce their Allegiance, hood-wink'd with a specious promise of Liberty,

*Sollicit Bre-
men and
Pomerania
to Rebellion.*

as a reward of their impiety. Immediately after War was denounced, and an herald to that purpose sent into *Sweden*, but one whose (otherwise) sacred administration was profan'd by a Libell,

*And
denounce
War.*

which declaring such frivolous and foul Causes of the said War, in so virulent a strain as never before was known to pass betwixt Kings, rendered those Causes yet more weak and contemptible.

Indeed he received his deserv'd censure by publique Authority, and the Danes themselves some time after, acknowledged the shamefulneſs of the thing, so that in the Treaty at *Roſchild* they condemned it; but whereas it holds out the departure of the Swedish Commiſſioner from *Copenhagen* as the occasion of the ensuing War, therein they add foul Impudence to Malice.

*Which was
contrived
long before
the Re-
ſidents
departure.*

For the Papers of *Andr. Bille* chief Generall to the King of *Denmark*, which came to our hands on the poſſeſſing of *Fredericks Ode*, and the Iſle of *Fuhnen*, are more then ſufficient proof, how long before his departure this War was decreed, and that they were moſt ſtudious

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to contrive means of haſtning his departure.

This publique Invective againſt the Swedes Nation was ſeconded by private calumny, the Peers of *Denmark* reckoning it great glory and merit to abound in tart Reproaches, contending for a maſtery in ſcurrility with their poor and fordid eloquence. So great a matter it ſeems it was to unleaſh a pen againſt the Swedes, and he that was the beſt proficient in ſcoffing and detraction, thereby preſum'd himſelf to be the worthieſt Patriot.

The were the Danifh Soldiers powr'd into the Countreys of *Sweden*,

*And loon
after broke
out.*

discovering every where much impotent rage, especially in the *Dukall* part of *Holftein* and *Breme*, which, together with the rest of *Sweden*, they had long since swallowed in hopes: but Divine Vengeance staid not long, but strook such terror and dread into them, that some of them durst not abide the approach of our men coming from the farther part of *Lettow*, but betook themselves for shelter to adjacent Islands;

*But were
loon
repulld by
the Swedes
from
Bremen and
the Dukall
Holftein,*

others received the wages of their rash adventure, being in a few dayes time utterly expelled the Dutchy of *Breme*, excepting onely the Castle of *Bremerford*. Soon after all *Jutland* submitted to the Swede, save that new built Fort of *Fredericks Ode*, which was at first stily maintained by a considerable party of the Danes. But the valiant Commander *Wrangle* encourag'd by his Majesties influence and his own valour, after he had begirt it a few weeks, won it, without any great loss of his own men, and having made great slaughter of the Enemy,

And Fredericks Ode taken.

carried with him two thousand Prisoners; amongst whom were the chief General of *Denmark* and another Senator.

His most Serene Majesty of *Sweden* did not forget in the current of these Victories his regard to Peace; Major General *Jephson* and Sir *Philip Meadows* Agents for his Highness the Lord Protector of *England*,

*In the mean
time
Sweden
offers terms
of*

*accommodati-
on by the
Engliſh
publique
Miniſters.*

promoting it with all diligence; of which the former then reſided in the Swediſh Court, the latter in the Daniſh, to ſettle a Peace betwixt them. But how was this receiv'd by the Danes? They vouchſaf'd an Anſwer indeed three ſeveral times to thoſe things Sir *Philip Meadows* had declar'd concerning this Buſineſſe, but with all they fought

(Paper)

with ſuch arrogancy and height to impoſe Laws on the Swedes,

*Which the
Dane con-
temns,*

that it might thence be eaſily diſcern'd, what ſmall affection they had to Peace, notwithstanding all that his moſt Serene Majeſty of *Sweden* could urge in his Declarations, to render them more calm and tractable. And that no man may be unſatisfied in this Relation, we have here ſubjoyn'd the whole buſineſſe of the ſeveral Entercourſes under the Letters, *A, B,*

*A, B, C, D,
E, F &c.*

C, D, E, F. &c.

Wherefore the Swedes perceiving themſelves to be onely born in hand with a counterfeit ſhew of Peace, and that the Danes did at the ſame time vigorouſly labour a Confederation with the Auftrian, Pole, and Brandenburgh,

*and makes
Leagues
with Auftria,
Poland, and
Brandenburgh.*

reſolv'd to infect them with War in their very lurking places, and ſince reaſon might not take place, to work them to it by force. Herein they found affiſtance from the extreme ſharpneſs of the Winter, which was ſuch that the whole Sea being frozen over, afforded paſſage, beyond all Record of example, for the whole Army of the Swedes into Fuhnen.

Whereupon

*the Swede
marching
over the Sea
doth poffels
himfelf of
Fuhnen.*

On that Ifland abode the flower and choice of the Daniſh Souldiery, as alfo all the moſt hardy Commanders, who notwithstanding being broken and put to flight, came into the power of the Swede, together with five Senatours of that Kingdom; ſo that it may well be affirm'd, that the Swediſh Affairs were by that dayes work much ſecured; and that the very foundations of the Daniſh Kingdom began to totter: thus the Channell of the Sea was no ſufficient Mote to fortifie him, who affum'd to himfelf the Pride and Infolence to oppreſſe others, who never had defer'd any ſuch uſage at his hands.

His Majeſty of *Denmark* being horribly ſurpriz'd with this News, and the more for that the Swedes had the ſame opportunity to paſſe into *Zealand*, began to adviſe with ſuch of his Peers, as he had about him, concerning a Peace,

*And the
Dane then
deſires a
Treaty of
Peace.*

deſiring the aforeſaid Engliſh Agent, Sir *Philip Meadows*, to mediate therein. Who, though he had found them deaf till then to all his Arguments of Peace, was very diligent and truſty to that charge, and ſending one of his Retinue to the King of *Sweden* then reſiding at *Odenſea* in *Fuhnen*, Letter G. adviſed him,

Letter G.

that the Danes were become inclinable to Peace. For that cold, which naturally doth

[Paper]
harden,

*Which is ac-
cepted of by
the Swedes.
Letter H.*

had now made the ſtony hearts of the Danes ſofter and more pliable then wax. To theſe Letters anſwer was made, Letter *H.* with great moderation,

such as could not be expected from a Prince in the height and heat of Conquest. The Messenger also return'd over the Ice into *Zealand* the same way he came, being instructed concerning the time and place of the Treaty.

In the mean time his most Serene Majesty of *Sweden*, holding it unmeet to flight his opportunity, moved by the Islands, *Langland*,

*Who
marcheth
over the Sea
into
Zealand.*

Laland, and *Falfter*, the way which Fates had opened, with his victorious Army toward *Zealand*, and at *Wordinburg* Castle met with the English Envoy Extraordinary, and some Danish Commissioners. There his Sacred Royal Majesty of *Sweden*,

*And a
Treaty
begins at
Wordinburg.*

understanding the Danes forwardness to lay hold on a Peace, made no delay, but joyn'd Commissioners of his with them, who, for that it was for the behoof of each Party, to use dispatch, might bring the matter to a speedy issue.

And doubtless a Peace had then been concluded, (*Monfieur Hugo Terlon* the Embassador in Ordinary from the most Christian King of *France* to the King of *Sweden*, and Sir *Philip Meadowes*,

*But broken
off by the
Danish
Commission-
ers, for
default of
Instructions*

whom we have often occasion to mention with commendation, much labouring therein) had not the Danish Commissioners pretended their Commission was not large enough to make a Peace in the terms then propounded by the Swedes. For which cause they departed to *Copenhagen* to return speedily with further Commission. In the mean time his most Serene Majesty of *Sweden*, that he might hasten the Peace, goeth

on with his Army, and was approach'd even to the gates of *Copenhagen*, when the Danish Commissioners returning with the English Envoy extraordinary, were wonderfully desirous to consummate the Agreement begun at *Wordingburg*. Whereupon those Honourable Persons, who had mediated, by the appointment of his Majesty of *Sweden*,

*And again
renewed at
Tofttrup,
where the
Articles
were
formed,
Letter I.*

gave meeting to the Commissioners of each Party at *Tofttrup*, a Village near *Copenhagen*, where, having spent some days on the traverse of Affairs, they resolv'd on certain Articles to be shortly after enlarg'd and polish'd at *Roskild*, Letter I. for that it was impossible in such

a huddle and speed to give caution to all emergent disputes and differences, that in tract of time might arise thereon. Which Articles,

*And
afterward
confirmed at
Roskild
Letter K.*

being prepar'd by the subscriptions of those Mediators and the Commissioners were finally confirm'd and ratified by both the Kings, Letter K.

It might be esteem'd almost miraculous, that his most Serene Majesty of *Sweden*, having been so much provok'd, and so set at naught by the Danes, should so govern his courage and resolution, as to forbear the utter destruction of that Nation, that had so often threaten'd to root out him and his. Doubtless the Kingdom of the Danes had then been brought to a period, and *Copenhagen*, that only remain'd, could have little avail'd them, being no otherwise defensible, but by the naked bodies of men. There you might have seen King and Peers all in a confusion, the Nobility at discord with the Citizens, the Soldiers mutining; and those, who should have been their guard and defence, pouring out all manner of threats and menaces. Inasmuch, that those that were most judicious, did most despair of the common safety, the wealthy Citizens imploring the favour and protection of the Swedes. The Fortresses that remained in *Schonen*, lay open to the

enemy; not onely for that the Ice had made the paffage eafie, but alfo for that moft of the Souldiers were drawn thence into *Zealand*.

But the moft Serene his Majefty of *Sweden* wanted nothing but will to ruine the Kingdom of *Denmark* and thofe, whom by force he might, he chofe rather to win by clemency, onely taking of the Enemies that part of the Countrey, which had formerly been injurioufly wrefted from the Swede; as alfo fome places in Norway for his fecurity, that though hereafter they would, they might not eafily annoy him.

Now who could imagine, that the Danes, who owe both their being and their dominion to be Swede, fhould demonftrate themfelves fo utterly unworthy of thofe benefits? For the Articles at *Toftrup* were fcarce figned, and a Ceffation of Arms on both fides proclaim'd, when they took the boldnefs prefently to difcover their malicious inclinations. It had been here declared amongft other things, that, before his Sacred Royall Majefty of *Sweden* fhould, for the better eafe of the Countrey

difpofe of his Souldiers in their Quarters, untill it fhould be agreed upon the time of their departure out of *Zealand* in the meeting at *Roskild*, the Danes fhould out of hand fend in their promis'd aid of 2000.

*But not duly
kept on the
Danifh part.*

Horfe. (For his Majefty of *Sweden* had generoufly difcharged them from fending in the 2000 Foot, which by force of the Articles at *Toftrup* they were bound to do, that he might exprefle his affection to the King of *Denmark*, who earneftly befought it, left he fhould be depriv'd of all Foot Forces for the maintenance of his Garrifons.) But mark what was here done. The Danes firft took advice, as afterwards plainly appear'd, whether it were not wifdom, under colour of fending in aid, to fet upon his moft Serene Majefty of *Sweden* at unawares, and to rid themfelves of the fear of an Enemy fo near at hand. The contrivers of this Device had prevail'd, had it not received oppofition from others, who did not fo much deteft the foulnefs of the Fact, as judiciously, difcern, that thofe Plots againft fo vigilant a King would hardly fucceed. Yet, left they fhould feem to deal too candidly with us,

*The
promifed
Horfe not
being fent as
was agreed.*

instead of two thousand German Horse, after much balking they sent us only nine hundred thirty six, and those in disorder too, as if it had been none of their business; and of these the least part Germans, or of any other Foreign Nations, but Danes born, in whom the Swedes could put little confidence; for that they knew it would be a grievous matter for them to bid adieu to their Country Pork and Pease; but rather, when the Swedish Army should march, they would flink away and forsake their Colours. Nor was it long ere it prov'd so, for of all that number there were only four hundred five, and those Foreigners. Certainly his Sacred Royal Majesty of Sweden might justly have had rejected that patch'd and imperfect supply of Horse, nor have admitted those that were Danes by birth, much less those of *Schonen*, such as were the Troups of *Axell Urop* to come in and fill up the number. For they being appointed at the charge of the Ministers and Bayliffs in *Schonen*, are to be concluded under the same condition with those that let them out, and were before that oblig'd by Covenants to pay Faith and Allegiance to the Kingdom of Sweden. But as his most Serene Majesty of Sweden

had not only pass'd over many things in those Treaties, whereon he might have insisted, but also in others had receded much from his right in reference to what was promised; so in the business of these Horse,

*Yet the
Swede doth
connive at
this,*

he was pleas'd to express his noble disposition, and to receive at the present such as the Commissioners of *Denmark* had been pleas'd to appoint him; yet on this condition, that the Remainder should speedily be provided, all sufficient and foreign Soldiers; at least, if they intended, that the Peace, which was drawn in short at *Toftrup*,

*Expecting
due
satisfaction
before the
full
ratification of
the Treaty.*

should receive a final confirmation at *Roskild*. Afterwards the Swedes Army was dispers'd into their Quarters, being ready to march out of *Sealand*, as soon as the business at *Roskild* should be dispatch'd.

And though it be almost incredible, that the Danes being cast upon those

extremities, should delay the conclusion of an Agreement,

*Yet the
Danes do
delay,*

especially since it was so much their concern to bring it to a speedy issue; yet many days were trifled away at *Roskild*, and the whole matter spun out in hopes of some change of Affairs. For then the Swedish army might be necessitated,

*Hoping for a
change of
affairs.*

and *Copenhagen* the better fortified against all attempts; and the Danes might have opportunity by Foreign Aids to make up their Breaches. But the fierceness of the winter, and the unwonted cold continued, contrary to the hopes of the Danes. His most Serene Majesty of *Sweden* who well enough perceiv'd the Danes drift, would not waste time upon the pretence of Treaties, the loss of which, as it is always considerable, so then it was inevitable;

*Which
perceived by
the Swede,
he threatens
the
attempting
of
Copenhagen.
Letter L.*

but rather he enjoyn'd his Commissioners to urge the Danes, adding this commination, that in case they continued to spin out longer delays, he must of necessity make recourse to his Warlike Power and besiege *Copenhagen*.

Whereupon it was at length concluded, Letter *L.* and those Gentlemen, which had mediated,

*And then the
Treaty was.
fully
subscribed*

subscribed two Instruments drawn thereupon, together with the Commissioners of each part, and interchangeably delivered them, according

to the custom.

But forasmuch as the Danes supposed themselves unable to sustain a War, which might happen to them, having lost

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many Provinces, and which they were oblig'd to part with by the renouncing of all other Leagues,

*And the
Danes infert
upon a
Treaty for a
nearer
League.*

it was earnestly fought of the Swedes, not only at *Toftrup*, but likewise at *Roskild*, that Commissioners of either Nation might suddenly be appointed for the contracting of a trait League between those two Northern Countreys; whereof they gave them sufficient hopes.

Moreover some further Articles were consented to,

*And private
Articles
were agreed
upon. Letter
M.*

Letter M. which were privately concluded, the Dane so desiring it, yet were enforced with the like authority that the former had, by the subscriptions of those honourable Mediators and the Commissioners.

We might observe the same candor in the Danes with the above noted, about the beginning of the Treaties at *Toftrup*, when in their Project they used for the most part ambiguous terms, only to the end, that they might reserve to themselves matter sufficient to wrest them in the future, to a sense injurious to us, in the mean time colourably affirming, that their sense was the same with what the words of the Swedes Commissioners carried. But this appear'd yet more manifest at *Roskild*, and chiefly in that the Danes at the making of their Protocoll or Registry were found guilty of that, which in the Cornelian Law *de falsis* is under a very sharp penalty restrained. For when the Swedish Commissioners in comparing the Projects of the Instrument of Peace,

*Yet the
Danes do*

*falsifie the
Articles.*

had observed amongst other things, that the Danes had not always in peripetuous terms express'd the sense of the Swedish Projects, they not onely defin'd upon that ambiguity the Danes exposition, but also, that no stop might be put to the behoofful Work of Peace, they were content, upon condition their verball explication might for the better caution be insert'd in the Protocoll or Regiftry, left by a different interpretation some controversie might arise between these Northern Nations in succeeding times. Yea, to the end the certainty might be clear and manifest, the Swedes in many things of chiefest moment did dictate to the Danish Pens the sense of each party. Hence it was that the Swedes were the more facile, and were content to conform to the expressions of the Danes in many places of

their Projects. Yet contrary to our hopes we afterwards found, that the Danes dealt very dissingenuously herein, notoriously depraving the Protocoll or Regiftry, as shall in its proper place hereafter appear. But whatsoever there is of this, would signifie little, (since by vertue of the Peace made, all miscarriages befor and in the Treaty were to be buried in oblivion) had they not after the Peace concluded renew'd matter of jealousy and diftempers,

*And give
cause of jea-
lousie after
the peace
concluded.*

stifling that mutuall confidence that should have been reviv'd and restor'd betwixt the two Kings. In the mean time his *S. R. M.* of *Sweden* understanding that the Treaties at *Roskild* were in a manner drawn to a conclusion, commands part of his Army to march to *Wordinburgh*, part to *Corfoer*, that they might pass over into *Jutland* and *Fuhnen* before the ice was thaw'd;

*When the
Swede had
given order
for a march
out of
Zealand.*

Count *Tot* was ordered to prepare for his departure to *Schonen*, to take possession in his Majesties name of those Towns and Castles, that were to be surrendred by the Danes.

But the News had scarcely come to the King of *Sweden*, being yet at

Ringfied of the finall conclufion of the Peace, when there pofted to him Owen Juull from Copenhagen with Letters Credentiall from the King of Denmark,

*By reafon
that he
refufes to
deliver the
Forts in
Schonen
according to
agreement,
offering
onely
Elflingburgh
an
inconfiderable
place.*

informing amongst other things, that the King could not render his Forts up in *Schonen*, fo foon as was expected; for that it was impoffible (by reafon it began to thaw) to bring the Swedifh Army out of *Sealand*; yet that he was ready, to deliver up the Cattle at *Hellingburgh* without delay for his fecurity. And that they might the more cleanly impofe upon the Swedes, he pretended, that the King of *Denmark* had not means enough to maintain thofe Garrifon Souldiers in *Schonen*, whileft the Swedifh Army remained in *Sealand* Nor would the faid *Juul* defift from that pretence, although the King of *Sweden* undertook to make provifion for thofe Souldiers. Wherefore his Majefty of *Sweden* difmifs'd the Agent with fuch Anfwer, as fuited with the prefent ftate of Affairs, and was not a little moved therewith, it being eafie to guefs what the Danes then defigned. For what fecurity could he promife himfelf with his Army in an Ifland void of all defence, if thofe Fortreffes in *Schonen* were denied him? He had been wholly at the Danes difpofall, and

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might have been brought to utmoft extremities, if the Danes had found aid from abroad.

And this was the fuggeftion of *Beuningen*, then Ambaffadour from the States of *Holland* into *Denmark*, who made them folemn promife,

*At the
perfwaſion of
Beuningen
upon
affurance of
fupplies from
Holland.*

that, if the furrendry of thofe Forts could be delay'd upon that pretence, they fhould have fufficient fupplies brought into *Denmark* for their relief, as foon as the fea was navigable. Adding further, if they were diftreff'd for money, he would procure them a large fupply, whereof alfo, as the report went, he gave them fome earneft, in lending them money at the prefent.

Thereupon the King of *Sweden* recall'd his Army with all hafte, which was gone part to *Wordinburgh*,

*Whereupon
the Swede
recalls his
army, Then
the Dane
condefcends
to furrender
Schonen.
Letter N.*

part to *Corfoer*, having fent his Secretary *Ehrentlein* to *Roskild* with ftrict Injunction to the Commiffioners, for preventing all occafion the Danes might ufe to make deniall, that there fhould be a particular Recefs appointed concerning the rendition of *Schonen*. Letter *N*. To which when the Danifh Commiffioners had eafily confented, (for they had proceeded fo far in words before) the Swedifh Army made ready once more to march away. But then the Froft flackned,

*And when
the Swedifh
Army was to
march the
fecond time
the weather
flackens.
Letter O.*

and the Ice was not able to bear fo great a weight, and the rather for that five or fix dayes had elaps'd, in fending and recalling the Army. And now his Majefty of *Sweden* defir'd to return into his Countrey, when Letters are brought him from the Danifh King, Letter *O*. wherein was contained, not onely the confirmation of what hath been faid of the Rendition at *Schonen*, but alfo he himfelf was invited into the Caftle of *Fredericksburgh* to a perfonall conference. Which latter part was alfo feconded by two of his chief Peers fent to *Roskild*.

*And the two
Kings meet*

*perfonally in
great confi-
dence.*

The King miflik'd it not, and therefore came with a fmall attendance. It was remarkable what great confidence each King had of the other; and hard to fay, which of the two was moft forward to give credit to the other: whether the King of *Sweden* were more confident, who adventur'd himfelf with fo fmall a guard among the Danes, that were more numerous; or the King of *Denmark*, who adventur'd his Perfon out of his Metropolis, whileft the Swede was Mafter of the whole Countrey round about. But

whether the one or the other, this is certain, that thofe two Kings fpent there fome dayes in fuch brotherly amity and friendfhip, that any man would conclude all bitterneffe and rancor was pafs'd over: Whereof this may ferve for proof, that the King of *Denmark* amongft other familiar difcourfes made mention of that League we formerly fpake of,

*And the
Dane doth
infift upon a
near union.*

wherein he efteem'd it neceffary, that thefe two Northern Kingdoms fhould be united, and defired with great inttance from the King of *Sweden*, that he would fend his Ambaffador into *Denmark* for that purpofe.

Thereupon his Majefty of *Sweden*, before his going to *Gottinburgh*, where he had commanded the Senatours of the Kingdom, and Deputies of the three Orders to meet him, that he might difcharge his faith and promife to the King of *Denmark*, and moft liberally perform all things,

*Which the
Swede
readily puts
in a way to
be encount-
ed.*

that tended to the amity of the Kingdoms, and the confirmation of the late concluded Peace, gave Order for fuch an Embaffay at *Malmoe* in *Schonen*, with ample inftructions, with all fpeed to eftablifh the League the Dane had fo earneftly fought, and he promis'd.

The Lord Baron *Stenot Bielcke*, Senatour of the Kingdom, and Sir *Peter Julius Coyet*, Counfellour of State, who were defign'd for that Embaffay,

cheerfully undertook their charge;

*Sending
Am-
bassadors,*

and being fet forwards on their Journey with all expedition, on the 19. day of *March* the same year they arriv'd at *Copenhagen*. There they were received in such fort,

*Who were in
appearance
received
with all
integrity.*

as was suitable to the honour of their Royall Masters, being brought in and treated with such great observancy of respect and reverence, that any one would thence ominate an happy event, and such as was desired to that Embassy. For the Senators of the Kingdom were very large in expressing their forwardness and their sincere desire to maintain that mutual correspondence, not only in the solemn admission of our Ambassadors to the King of *Denmark*, but also in all private conferences; sharply inveighing against the publique Ministers of other States, who had entangled them in that War by several insinuations and devices. But how far different was the purpose of these Danes, 'twill be no hard matter for any man to guess, who shall understand

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by the subsequent Narrative,

*But not so in
effect.*

that the Danes in pretence of a League had no other aim, but by their engines and devices, if not wholly to overthrow, yet for the most part to evacuate and defeat the Treaty at *Roskild*, and by protracting the concluding of Peace, to gain time, and on the first occasion that presented it self, by force and fraud to regain their lost Provinces, the latter of which many of the Danish Nobility have not been ashamed to talk of openly.

'Twas a strange thing, that the Danish Ambassadors, the Lord *Axell Urop*, and *Peter Reetzi*, both Senators of the Kingdom should in their first meeting with the Swedish Ambassadors at *Copenhagen* the 29. of *March* refuse to draw up, as was their charge, any grounds and foundations of that League so much desired first at *Toftrup*, then at *Roskild*, by the Danish Commissioners,

and laftly at *Fredericksburgh* by the King himfelf.

*The Danes
refufing to
deliver the
gounds of
the League
in writing.*

Yet on the laft day of the faid moneth of *March* they had another meeting and then after many delayes they pretended a form of that League in words, but would not exhibit it in writing, till the Swedes had firft exhibited theirs.

To fay the truth, 'twas a matter of no great moment, and of little concern, which part fhould firft caft their Articles into paper, but that there were hot coals cover'd under thefe embers. For what elfe did the Danes defign, but to fift out the meaning of the Swedes, and to rake together matter to pervert it, and render them odious to other Nations, as if they onely did eagerly purfue thofe things, whereby other men might in any kinde fuftein lofs or prejudice. And that they might carry their Impofture the more fmoothly,

*But at laft
done,*

they defired, that whatfoever pafs'd in word or writing in reference to the League,

*Secrecy is
impofed on
both fides,*

fhould be kept clofe and fecret from all the world. But they were moft imprudently catch'd by their own Law, which they had devifed to tye up others. For they acknowledg'd, that the Project,

*But not ob-
ferv'd by the
Danes.*

which the Swedes had firft drawn and delivered, was loft, afault hardly to be excus'd in any fervant, much lefs in fuch Guardians of fecrets, as they look upon themfelves to be. Yet this careleffnefs might be excus'd, had they not in a manner publifhed to all men, what ever was either written or fpoken,

*Who
revealed all*

*to Beunen-
gen the
States
Ambaffador,
who did ob-
fruct all,*

and efpecially to *Beuningen* Ambaffadour

[Paper]

of the States of the united Provinces, by whose direction and counfell they ordered and managed ftill their Defignes and Determinations, infomuch that he hath often boafed, that he was the onely hinderance of the conclufion of the League betwixt the Swedes and Danes,

Letter P.

Letter *P.*

But the event will declare what profit hath accrewed to the Kingdom of *Denmark*, or may for the future be expected by hearkening to fo perverfe Councells; This is certain, that his Majefty of *Sweden* had no other regard in this League,

*Whereas the
Swedilh
whole aim
was to to
preferve the
Northern
Kindoms in
Peace.
Letter Q.*

but to fecure the trade of the Baltick fea, and preferve the Kingdom of *Denmark* from the attempts of other Enemies. Which if ever, was then moft neceffary; and as all the Swedes Propofalls in reference to the League, fo that laft, Letter *Q.* do clearly manifeft, that he had no other fcope, but to preferve thofe Northern Kingdoms *without the prejudice and detriment of any other*, as the precise words in the Eleventh Article of the former approved Propofalls being read will difcover.

On the contrary the Danes had far different defigns,

*But the
Daniilh
defign was
to make the*

*treaty at
Roskild of
none effect,
as the
dubious
event of
Wars might
give the
advantage.*

and directed all their craft, that under colour of contracting a traitor League, they might shrink from the obligation of the Treaty at *Roskild*, and that by tying up the Swedes, they might suspend the execution of very many of those points upon the dubious event of Wars, wherein the Swedes must be immediately involved, not observing that the Treaty spoke absolutely, and took force immediately from the ratification of the Peace. Many things might here be alledged touching the unreasonable demands of the Danes, wherewith they had the confidence to urge the Swedes in their Projects, but because they are partly (though but colourably) either mended or expunged in their last, Letter *R.* and are partly manifest by conferring the Swedish and Danish projects, we shall pass them over,

Letter R,

only reciting what was the main cause of breaking off that Treaty.

In the Third Article of the transactions at *Roskild*,

*The cause of
the breaking
off, of that
private
Treaty.*

amongst other things it was provided, that the Kingdoms of *Sweden* and *Denmark* should jointly endeavour to impede the passage of any Fleet of War through the Sound into the Baltick Sea,

to the end that the King and Kingdom of *Sweden*, together with the Kingdom of *Denmark* might preserve their power and command, which they have always jointly held to this day, in the Baltick Sea, and from all prescription have retained inviolate against all Opposers of what kinde, or under what pretence forever.

The occasion of this caution, was not only a negotiation some years since carried on by a Resident of *Poland* at the *Hague*, touching a League then to

be made between the King of *Poland*,

*The Danes
having viola-
red the
former
Treaties,*

and the States of the united Provinces, of which this was one main drift, that a Dutch Fleet of War should be equipped and sent into the Baltick Sea; but also the Fleet that was sent in the year 1656. contrary to the Privilege of these Northern Kingdoms, though by consent of the King of *Denmark* as Joynt Commander, and that not onely sent through the Sound to relieve and supply the enemies of the King of *Sweden*,

*by bringing
in a foreign
Navy into
the Baltick
Sea.*

but also enforced by some of the Danes Men of War, contrary to the Faith both of his word and writing, to a great and generall mischief. Which to prevent for the future, and to stop the claim of any other Nations, who might seek to send any Fleet into the Baltick Sea, pretending a consent of one of the Joynt-Commanders of that Sea, the Swedes found it necessary most effectually to oblige the King of *Denmark*, not onely from any such consent in the future, but also that whenever any Fleet should endeavour to pass in the dislike of either of those Kings, the other should jointly oppose their passage.

*Which the
Swede
would
prevent in
time to
come.*

For it was the intent of his *S. R. M.* of *Sweden*, in case he should at any time make War upon his Enemies, to secure all things behind him, and especially Sea-ward, nor to permit, that any State by the like Attempts in future, should challenge a passage by prescription, in the wrong and prejudice of those Northern Kingdoms.

But it is not materiall to discover at large that the Command of the Baltick Sea, and consequently the power and right of prohibiting any Fleet of War,

doth joyntly belong to thefe two Kingdoms, fince there was never yet any difpute thereof between the faid Kingdoms, neither have either of the Kings at any time interpofed, when the other hath ufed or

claimed his power againft Intruders. We have an example of this in that Renowned King of Swedes the great *Guftavus Adolphus*, who was never controul'd or refifted, whileft he deftroyed that Fleet, which the Duke of *Fridland* had provided in the Baltick Sea, under the Commiffion of the German Emperour *Ferdinand* the Second. In the like manner, when *Chriftian* the Fourth King of *Denmark* gave chafe to a fhip, which under Commiffion from the King of *Poland* would have exacted Customs, near the City of *Dantzick*, the King of Swedes never expreffed any diflike. The fame thing is likewife teftified at large by the fverall writings of thofe Kings then publifhed.

Sure it is, that the Swedes might yield to the Danes defires, that the third Article of the tranfaction of *Roskild*, as alfo at *Toftrup* was fet down in this form: *That no Enemy fhould be permitted to fend a Fleet of War into the Baltick Sea*. But in this fenfe, as the Danifh Commiffioners themfelves expounded it, that no forreign Fleet under what pretence foever fhould pafs into the faid Sea, though not efteem'd enemy to one of the Nations, and that in this cafe Forreign and Enemy were words Synonymous, and equivalent. Hence it was, that to make it the more apparent, in the faid third Article thofe two appellations went together, chiefly becaufe the Danes pretended the word Enemy muft therefore be added, left other States might thence apprehend matter of diflike or fufpition.

But indeed the Danes, who in their own Right, and alfo by vertue of the Agreement at *Roskild*, were oblig'd to jovn with his Majefty of *Sweden*, in prohibiting all forreign Fleets from the Baltick Sea, to preferve themfelves from a publique guilt of violating the Peace, fteer'd a quite contrary courfe, and that they might put a ftop upon the procedes of the Swedes fuccesfes in War,

*But the
Danes feek
to elude,*

ufed all artifice to extricate and acquit themfelves from that obligation.

Which to accomplifh they thought a fit opportunity prefented it felf in the debates of the League wherein they might flyly elude and change that abfolute Covenant of excluding forreign Fleets from the Baltick Sea into a Conditionall one; or to fpeak plainly, to defer it to a day and time not at all

prefix'd.

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For although that often cited third Article of the tranfaction at *Roskild* doth clearly affirm, that either of thefe confederate Kings was bound, not onely by all means poffible to hinder the paffage of any Forreign Fleet of War by the Sound into the Baltick Sea, but alfo that no other Prince befides the faid Kings, fhould prefume to furnifh or ufe any Fleet of War in that Sea:

*By limitting
the third
Article at
their
pleafure to
have this
fenfe.*

yet the Danifh Commiffioners had the confidence to limit that Obligation in their Projects, that it was to be underftood, when thofe Wars, the Swede was now engag'd in, fhould be ended; and that not till then they were oblig'd to the performance, as it evidently appears by the fourth and fifth Article of the Danifh Projects laft by them produced.

But this poffibly might be pafs'd by, had they not abus'd the true and evident meaning, with forc'd interpretations. For whereas the Swedifh Ambaffadours did plainly demonftrate; that that added condition, or to fpeak truly, the delaying of mutual aid was needlefs; for that there was no intent to involve the Kingdom of *Denmark* in the Wars the Swedes then had in hand; but rather the promis'd Affiftance was onely Naval, confifting in a certain definite number of fhips fufficiently appointed, which the Kingdom of Sweden could not ftand in need of, neither againft the Mufcovite, Pole, nor Emperour of Germany, (then King of Hungary and Bohemia) forasmuch as none of thefe were powerful at Sea; and that the League had reference onely to thofe, who being no neighbours to the Baltick Sea, fhould attempt to infringe the juft Dominion of thofe Kings. To which the Danes gave this anfwer, That no Forreigner, during the Swedes Wars with the Mufcovite, Pole, or the Houfe of *Auftria* of the Imperial Line, would dare attempt to enter thofe Seas with any Fleet,

*That it
fhould be of
no force till
the prefent
Wars fhould
be ended.*

unless he were Friend or Confederate to one of those forenamed Enemies of the Swedes; and for that reason it would be no new War but the continuation of the present. The Danes therefore insisted upon that Clause, *When the War shall be ended, which the Swedes have now in hand*: adding further diverse sharp speeches, which would be too long here to relate.

Now forasmuch as that Treaty of the League did comprehend

matters of two kinds, to wit, the Consequences of the Agreement at *Roskild*, which were therefore of perpetual Obligation; and such things as should arise from that particular Convention, and were to be in force after the Peace was ratified, and therefore ought to be restrained to a time certain: the Swedish Ambassadors, as the nature and condition of those things required, always carefully observed that difference in their Proposals, as is very evident from the twelfth Article. But the Danes, who thought it a sufficient discharge of their duty, if they did wilfully pursue their own method, though they were often advised of it, yet in the fourth, fifth, and tenth Article of their Proposal, made mixture and confusion of all things; intending that whatsoever was contained in the Treaty of the League, was all to commence from the Ratification thereof, and would have it in force only for the twelve Years following, not regarding that those things which concern the defence of the Dominion in the Baltick Sea, did bind them to a perpetual obligation from the time of the Peace made, as the Covenants themselves held it forth. That aid also, which was to be supplied by either Nation, for the excluding of Foreign Fleets of War out of the Baltick Sea, as was the tenor of the Agreement, fell under the same confusion. For it was in all things couch'd under the same Qualifications with those Supplies, which by virtue of the League to ensue, to wit, in case either King should be assailed, the other was oblig'd to afford only for twelve years following, and to the certain number often ships only. Truly, it seems, they had no other ground herein, but that they thought the Swedes fit to be deluded with such open Impostures, and out of a natural hatred to the Nation, esteemed them so stupid and foolish, that they could not discover their Agreements to be frustrated and avoided by devices and shifts. And, if we must be plain, it appears, that had not some of ours been too credulous, and trusted too much to the ingenuity of the Danes, the Swedish Ambassadors had not perhaps been satisfied with that Exposition the Danes made at *Roskild*, nor by their own easiness had encourag'd them to attempt the same course at *Copenhagen*.

Therefore when the Swedish Ambassadors observ'd that

the Danes endeavoured by those forc'd limitations utterly to evacuate and

render ufelefs the enfuing League;

*And the
Swedes
feeing their
falle in-
tentions, are
forced to
break off.*

and that thofe finifter fufpicions, which the bare name and report of a mutuall League between thefe Kingdoms might raife with forreign Nations, (for this Hobgoblin was almoft daily produc'd like the Gorgon's Head) were onely colourably pretended, and that their heat and affection to the conforming of a League which they exprefs'd in words immediately after the Peace concluded, not onely grew Lac-warm, but was utterly extinguifhed, and that their labour was fruitlefs, they were unwilling to be longer fed with vain hopes, efpecially fince they had manifettly difcovered that other heads had influence upon, and acted the Danifh Counfellors. Therefore they themfelves were the firft that brake off the Treaty, thinking it more fafe and prudent, to expect a more ferious return thereto, after the Wars, which the Swedes have now in hand, were ended, and that in the mean time what concerns the perfecting the Peace at *Roskild*, and the excluding Forreigners out of the Baltick Sea fhould be inferted into a particular Recefs, which they call declarative. But as the Danifh Commiffioners did with all readinefs embrace the former, fo they utterly abandoned the latter, faying that it was to light a Candle to the Sun; if any man fhould in this point endeavour to enlighten or unfold the Articles at *Roskild*. One might be here at a ftand whether the Danes may more juftly be taxed of ingratitude or of imprudence but that it is certain that the former is never feen but in the worft of men, the latter may fometimes fall upon good and worthy perfons, and therefore is much more excufable. For to endeavour to abufe, and fraudulently to circumvent fuch a King, to whom by Divine Providence, and the prosperous fuccels of his Forces, almoft the whole Kingdom of *Denmark* lay vanquifh'd, and who might have facrific'd it to his revenge, if his juft fury had fet it on fire, and might have made the whole Nation Exiles and Caitiffes; after Peace granted them, and the greateft part of their Territories, to the wonder of the whole world, reftored; thus to requite fuch a King is moft foul and deteftable Ingratitude. Neither is it lefs imprudence then to difcover the vilenefs of their mindes,

[Pause]

when he yet remained in the bowells of their Kingdom with a moft powerfull Army, and might have taken fuch vengeance on the violaters of Peace, as pleas'd him beft. But as high and generous fpirits are not eafily provok'd to

Revenge, especially if there be hopes of amendment, without the utter destruction of the faulty; fo his Sacred Royall Majefty of *Sweden* chofe rather to make proof by any courfe,

*And ftanding
to the Treaty
at Roskild,
do publifh it.*

whether the Danes might by reafon and without force be wrought to their juft Devoir. To which he thought nothing more expedient, then by a clear Declaration to fet out the Covenants agreed at *Roskild*.

The reafon of producing and declaring this Treaty at *Roskild*, as we faid before, was this, becaufe the Danes feigned divers complaints and grievances, accused the Swedes of oppofing and violating the Peace lately concluded, made a fenfe that could not at all ftand with the Agreements at *Roskild*, and quite contrary to the meaning of the Commiffioners, and that befides fome things were mutually promifed in that tranfaction, which by neceffary and unavoidable confequence concluded the alteration of the Agreements at *Bromfebroe* in many places. To put a timely ftop upon this, and as much as layes in the power of humane providence, utterly to extirpate and root out fuch feeds of divifion, his moft Serene Majefty of *Sweden* fent Pofitive Orders to thofe Ambaffadours,

*That the
Complaints
and
Grievances
wherewith
the Danes
did: blame
the Swedes,
might be
removed.*

which he had empowered to confirm the Peace, to ufe their efpeciall care and endeavours herein. Nor did they in this omit any thing, but ftill in performance of their duty, made it their onely aim and defign to fettle a lafting peace and quiet betwixt thefe Northern Nations. To this purpofe they met the Danifh Commiffioners very often, and they ufed all kinde of dexterity and prudence to lay open all thofe things, which for the future might come into controverfie, on purpofe to give the Danes an opportunity to gratifie themfelves. For what, pray, could have been more neceffary for the Kingdom of *Denmark*, efpecially as their Affairs then ftood if out of fincerity of heart and a reall intention they had made a Peace? What more ac-

ceptable to God? What more glorious in the fight of the whole world, then for two Neighbour Kingdoms, professing

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the same Religion, together and at the same time to settle a Peace, and remove all those causes, that for the future might raise up any controversy betwixt them? Yet, for all this, the Danes, as if they had been possessed with a fatal blindness, could never settle their minds seriously to promote it. For though the Swedish Ambassadors offered nothing, but what was just in it self; and the Danes could not find any thing to carp at, only they said, they spent their pains to no purpose in explaining of that, which was clear enough in it self, and did plainly express the meaning of the Commissioners: yet being urged, for the prevention of all mistakes, to set down what ever both Parties mutually agreed upon in writing, they brought in another form, putting such a sense upon the transaction at *Roskild*,

Concerning
the Swedish
ships passing
through the
Sound.

as might in part weaken and destroy all the accretments arising out of the Swedish Ships passing the Sound or Baltick Sea, in part much infringe their freedom from Customs, which they were of necessity to enjoy, by virtue of the Laws and Statutes of the Nation, but most especially by reason of the Agreements made at *Bromsebroe*.

No man surely, unless biased either by anger or malice, that knows the condition and commerce of these Northern Kingdoms, can persuade himself, that the Swedes, who at that time might have acted their pleasure upon the Danes, and had power enough to put Laws on their enemies, were so blinded as to make their condition worse then it was formerly, especially in so nice a point at Passports and Certificates are, the form, right, and validity of which had with such care and diligence been settled at *Bromsebroe*.

You will scarcely too find any, unless delighted to pick Cavils, that can put any other interpretation upon the fourth Article of the transaction at *Roskild*, especially these words in the beginning; *All and every Ship of Swethland, with what kinde of Merchandize foever they carry*: but that all the ships of *Sweden* with their Merchandize of what sort soever, and to whom soever belonging, ought to pass freely, and without paying any Customs, so that they have with them their Pass-ports, with the names of the Owners in them, if he well consider the following words of the Article. Notwithstanding

[Page]

ftanding thefe things, the Danifh Commiffioners made a queftion both of the one and the other, as alfo of many other things that concern the concluding of the Peace; and had the confidence to defend it againft all likelihood of truth, reafon, the credit of the Records, and their knowledge, who were never abfent at that tranfaction at *Roskild*.

But any man may with good probability affirm,

*And
concerning
the fubftance
of the whole
Treaty at
Roskild,*

that the Danes have not voluntarily performed in a manner any thing, to which they were oblig'd by the Agreement at *Roskild*, in that they put off moft of them to a time not prefix'd; nor had ever performed them, had not the Affairs of his Sacred Royal Majefty of *Sweden*, arm'd him both with power and opportunity to have conftrain'd them.

It would be too large a ftory, to relate all their crafty Devices, Pretences, Cavils, tedious Diverfions and Procraftinations,

*The Danes
defer the
conclufion,
according to
the news
which are
bruietd
againft
Sweden.*

by which the Danes hop'd they might fhift off the conclufion of the Peace, and gain time till fome emergent Wars or Troubles in other places might withdraw the Swedifh Army out of *Denmark*. Therefore they fitted all their Treaties Executive to common Report and News, fometimes protracting them, as when it was reported that the Mufcovite was levying a great Power, wherewith he would without doubt affail the Swedes in *Finland* and *Leiftand*; or that the Coffacks had concluded a Peace with the Poles, and therefore that the Swedes had fmall hopes left them to compofe their Differences there; or that the election of the then King of *Hungary* to be Emperor of *Germany*, could be no longer delayed, who together with the Elector of *Brandenburgh*, would undoubtedly raife Troubles on the Swedes, and draw them out of *Denmark*: on the other fide, fometimes pofting on their faid

Treaties upon contrary reports. So that whosoever fhall compare the times of their Affembles, according to the tenor of the Protocol, may obferve, that the Danes made fhew of intending the concluding of the Peace, and to ftand to their promifes, as the feverall reports came, either that the Electour of *Brandenburgh* would not be oblig'd by the League made with the King of *Hungary* againft the Swedes; or that the Swedifh Ambaffadour in *Ruffia* were reftored again to liberty,

and a War probably to be commenced between the Mufcovite and the Pole: or that the election of the Emperour at *Franckfurt* was unexpectedly deferred; or that the moft Chriftian King of *France* together with the Lord Protector of *England*, had worfted the Spanifh Army, with other matters of the like tendency.

It was furely tedious enough to be thus born in hand with Treaties, but moft tedious and offensive, that the Danes fought to clear themfelves of the caufes of all thofe delays, giving out not onely in *Coppenhagen*,

And yet endeavour to
lay the fault
upon
Sweden.

but in all parts abroad, that they had no fooner removed any one obftacle, but the Swede ftill put in another, that they might never want a quarrell to continue their Army in *Denmark* beyond the time agreed for their departure, to the utter waiting and ruine of their Countreys. But as all thofe things are falfe and feign'd, fo they were alledged by the Danes to no other purpofe, but that they might charge the Swedes with the fault of all their Procraftinations, and as far as they could be believed, render the Swedes odious to the world.

Thence alfo it was, that as foon as the Ambaffadors came to *Coppenhagen*, the Danes were not afhamed to accufe the Swedes, both by words and writing of not keeping the Peace, and renewed the fame Complaints again not onely to them, but to his Sacred Royall Majefty of *Sweden* himfelf by *Owen Juul* at *Gothenburgh*, and that contrary to all reafon, by wrefting the Conditions to their own advantage, directly contrary to the precise words and tenor of the Agreement, as hereafter fhall more largely be difcovered,

Nor doth this feem to be done without fome crafty intention, that the Danifh Commiffioners having heard that the Swedifh Ambaffadours did often alledge the authority of the Protocol,

*Whereas
they
themselves
would not
bring a
Register to
keep the
Protocoll.*

and from thence did plainly demonstrate the genuine sense of the instrument of Peace, and the very verbal explication of the Commissioners of either party, would not bring with them a man, who for the information of Posterity might be wholly employed in this business, to insert into the Protocoll or Registry all that was said and done in the several meetings. When they were put in mind of this by the Swedish

[Pause]

Commissioners, they excus'd the absence of their Register, being a Noble Man and one of their Chancellours, who about the beginning of the Treaties, had for a month discharg'd that Office, but was now absent from the City: as if men fit for that employment were so scarce in *Denmark*, nor that a man in *Copenhagen* could be found fit to supply his place.

And this did not a little encrease our suspicion,

*Nor would
they be per-
suaded to
furnish
persons with
full-power to
treat and
conclude.*

that the Danish Commissioners, though they were often advertis'd of it, could never be persuaded to furnish Persons with a full power for the Executive Treaties. Indeed it cannot be denied, that at the first meeting for the making of this League, the Commissioners of either party were plenipotentiary delivering and changing each with other full and sufficient Commissions of the same tenour: but those did principally regard the League onely, and when that was over, being the principle matter, they could be of no further force, as appears clearly out of the Plenipotentiary Commissions of the Swedish Ambassadors, Letter S. Wherefore the Swedish Ambassadors being instructed with new power from their King,

Letter S.

acquainted the Danes therewith, shewing them the Original and Authentick Commiffions, and offering them to take Copies of them, instantly preffing them, that they would be prepar'd with the like, that the solemnity of the whole tranfaction might be clear and manifest. But all this labour was fruitles; neither have the Danes to this day performed what they had so often promis'd.

But it had been no hard matter for them to have procur'd the like sufficient Commiffions (which were the very foundation and essentiall part of the Treaties) when the Swede supplied them with the forms. Nor could they pretend forgetfulness, who had been so often put in minde of it. Nor was it a new and unusual course in the beginning of any Treaty to exchange such Commiffions, for that a few weeks before, upon the first meeting about the League, the same ceremony had been used.

Out of all which, as it is easie to collect what the Danes were working in their mindes, so it shall be yet more clearly discovered by a Narrative of some things concerning the Declarative and Executive Recefs.

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But before we descend to a full discourse of them, it will not be unfit briefly to hint, how the Danes carried themselves touching the satisfaction they promised to the Duke of *Holftein Gottorp*.

Concerning
the Duke of
Holftein.

There had been an ancient controversy between the House of *Holftein* of the *Gottorpien* Line, and the Kings of *Denmark*, who are also Duke of *Holftein*, concerning the Chapter of *Sleswick*, and the Jurisdiction of *Swabted*, of which the moiety by clear Right had belonged to the forefaid Dukes of *Holftein* for seventy years past. Neverthelesse the Kings of *Denmark* had taken to themselves the whole Chapter and Jurisdiction,

The wrongs
done unto
him.

not regarding the frequent solicitations, by which the Dukes of *Holftein* had endeavoured to have the matter decided by Arbitrators indifferently chosen for the consideration of their right.

Likewise at the beginning of this War, the Danish Soldiers had so griev'd the Subjects of the forementioned Duke with continuall exactions, that worse could scarce have been expected from an enemy, and that the condition of the most Serene Duke was worse than those of the Nobility, who by reason of the communion of Government were obnoxious to the power of the King of *Denmark*.

Those Territories had undergone the self-same fate in the Wars, which *Christian* the Fourth had wag'd first with *Ferdinand* the second, Emperor of *Germany*, and afterward with the King of Swedes, and the said Duke was oppress'd with the charge of a War, which he had neither advis'd, nor as the Union of the Kingdom of *Denmark* with the Dukes of *Sleswick* expressly required, approved, and that only under this pretence, that as he was Duke of *Sleswick*, he was a Vassal of *Denmark*, and that in the administration thereof, as also of the Dutchy of *Holftein*, he took turns with the Kings of *Denmark*.

Hereto may be added, that *Bille* General of *Denmark*, having been directed to that purpose by *Gerdforffe* high Steward of the Kingdom, contriv'd plots for the gaining of the Dukes Forts, and thereby seiz'd the strong Rampire of

Stapelholme.

Therefore when the Duke found by sad experience, that it was his lot to be underferv'dly embroyl'd in all the Wars of

[Pause]

Denmark, and that, although he was posses'd of the Dutchy of *Sleswick* in *Franck Fee*, yet he was made a common prey to both sides, he bethought himself, as with justice he might, how to quit himself of the burthen of that Vassallage, and communion in the Government of the Dutchies; and not onely to assert his right to the moiety of the Chapter of *Sleswick*, and Jurisdiction of *Swabted*, together with so many years fruits, but to obtain due recompence for the wrong he had sustained.

For the more easie effecting whereof, his Majesty of *Sweden* being thereto oblig'd both by the bonds of blood and alliance, as also for that he had suffered much from the Danes out of the hatred they bare to the Swedes, offered his assistance,

*Wherein the
Swedes
endeavour
to see him
righted.*

frailty enjoying those, who were sent to conclude the Peace, that they should have an especiall regard to that business.

Nor were the Swedish Commissioners wanting in that charge, and they drew the whole matter to this head, that the Danish Commissioners consented to those three demands; to wit, of the Jurisdiction of *Swabted*, and Chapter of *Sleswick*, whereof they had claimed the one half in their own Right, the other in lieu of profits received, unless they would make satisfaction otherwise; likewise concerning the discharging him from the burthen of Fealty,

*Which the
Danes
having
promised, do
not perform.*

and lastly to the surcease of the communion in the government and administration of those Dutchies. And the Swedish Commissioners were earnestly urg'd by those Gentlemen which had mediated, that they would acquiesce upon those concessions. But when the Swedish Commissioners did require of them to deliver into their hands the City of *Rendsburgh* in satisfaction of the

wrong done, and also for future caution, that the Duke might be put to no further trouble, and the Danes precisely and peremptorily denied it; neither had the Swedish Commissioners any power to dispence with the rendry of the City to the Dukes prejudice, the dispatch of the whole matter was referred to the coming of the Ambassadors of *Holftein* who were expected every moment, yet so as that business should make a peculiar Article in the Treaty of *Roskild*, by force whereof a just satisfaction was promised to be made to the said Duke before the second day of *May*.

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Indeed it cannot be denied that the words of the Article are generally, neither is the satisfaction restrain'd to those four demands, on which the Swedish Commissioners did insist in the name of the said Duke; yet since the Danes in the presence of those Mediators had then already promis'd the three former, which might not be put in writing, only because the Danes were always noting the Swedes with the narrowness of the Dukes Commission, it was scarcely possible that any man should harbour so hard a thought of the Danes, that they should have the boldness to question the truth of those things, which had been done and declar'd in the presence of so many witnesses, persons beyond all exception; and especially when the King of *Denmark* himself had given manifest hopes to the Ambassador of the French King to that purpose.

Yet notwithstanding as soon as they came to *Copenhagen*, and began to treat about satisfaction with the delegates of *Holstein*, the Danes there turn'd faces about, were quite of another mind, and sometimes by denying what they had promised at *Roskild* in the presence of those Gentlemen that mediated, sometimes by seeking out new shifts and refuges, suffered the whole time to lapse that was prefix'd them. And to discover themselves the more, they intimated to Sir *Philip Meadows* the English Envoy Extraordinary a Protest,

Letter T.

Let. T. wherein they endeavored to lay all the blame on the delegates of *Holstein*, for hindering the dispatch of the affair, and declar'd their willingness to refer that controversy to Arbitrators, never considering that that way of composing of difference in this business had been so often made use of without the least effect. Hence it is, that they can never make good their Protest to any, that do not take promise for performance. For the Danes being bound by the 22. Article of the Treaty at *Roskild*, in full and precise words to make satisfaction to the most Serene the Duke of *Holstein*, before the second day of *May*; it was not enough for them to express a willingness to submit to those things, which Arbitrators chosen by either party would have had adjudged; nor were they to be accounted to have given any satisfaction in it, in that they desir'd only to delay the Business by bare promises. Besides the business of satisfaction ought

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not to have been agreed by Arbitrators, but by Commissioners of either party, although that way too, had the Danes been willing to have had the controversy decided, the matter might have been brought to a speedy issue, and according to the Proposals of the Ambassadors of *Sweden* with the

content of those of *Holftein*, referred by both Parties to the arbitrement of those Gentlemen that were Mediatours. But this reliev'd not well with the Danes, who made as great a business about the narrowness of their Commission, as if they had been to renew it in some foreign Country. The truth of it is, the Danes declin'd the putting of it to the Arbitration of those Gentlemen that were Mediatours, because they well knew, that they were privy to all the Promises they had made at *Roskild*, and therefore could expect no good success in so bad a cause, where the Judges understood the whole matter. Nay, as if the Danes had accounted it some great sin to perform what they had engag'd their faith to, there were some amongst them that would have the Peace broken under the pretence of the *Holftein* business, and that there were such kinde of Contrivances cherish'd in the Danish Court, the French Ambassadour *Monfieur Hugo Trelon* informed his Sacred Royall Majesty of *Sweden* his Ambassadors at *Copenhagen*. A thing indeed so much the more likely, in that they made use of *Alfeld* to compose the *Holftein* Controversies, being the same man that with his Colleges of his own name had used all his endeavours and artifices to persuade, that the treaties with the Swedes might be brought at least to give way for some entry for their Confederates. Hence it was, that both of them, who were deputed by the Danes for the business of *Holftein*, instead of satisfaction presumed to raise menaces against the most Serene Duke, spreading abroad that the Swedish Army would not be there for ever, under whose countenance he might impose such unjust things on the Danes. As if it were unjust for one to challenge that, which for seventy years past had contrary to all Law and Right been detain'd from him; or to shake off that yoke from his shoulders, which without the least fault in him hath involv'd him thrice in a bloody War; or lastly to desire reparation for the loss he had sustained.

At laft after many long debates, the Swedifh Ambaffadours told the Danes to their faces, that though they perform'd every thing elfe, yet if they did not this too, the Swedifh Army fhould not march away, by which means that controverfie was laid afide, though neither any time appointed, nor thofe things gained, which had been heretofore promis'd at *Roskild*, And this by the way.

When therefore, as we faid before, the Danes being perfwaded by the fuggeftions of others, had fraudulently and maliciously fram'd a form of the League, and given fufficient caufe to break up the Treaties,

*Nor would
they conde-
fcend, that
there fhould
be a
particular re-
ceffe
concerning
the Defence
of Supe-
riority and
Right in the
Baltick Sea.
Letter U.*

the Ambaffadours of *Sweden* inferted into a particular Recefs that Article, that concern'd the defence of Superiority and Right in the Baltick Sea, as alfo other points that tended to the plainer declaration of the Third Article of the Agreements at *Roskild*. For there was no reafon, why the Danes fhould refufe to confirm it, forasmuch as that Article, *Letter U.* was taken out of the Articles approv'd by the Commiffioners of each Party when the League was drawn, with which it did in all things fuit, as is fufficiently evident by the comparing of thofe Articles.

But let us obferve the carriage of the Danes herein. When they faw themfelves caft into this neceffity, either by admitting that point to abandon the opportunity, by which under fome pretence and colour of Right they might quit themfelves from the Agreement at *Roskild*, and efpecially from the obligation of the Third Article; or elfe by abrupt refufall they muft difcover their purpofe hitherto conceal'd, which was not to be bound to a perpetuall obfervance of the Treaty at *Roskild*, they chofe the fafer way, contending that the Treaty at *Roskild* as to this point was clear of it felf, and needed no other explication; and that they did ftick to the fame meaning, which that

point in the Swedish Project did hold forth. At least, to shun the suspicion, which other Nations might thence apprehend, that they would not permit that that Article should be so clearly inserted in a particular Reces, as also they always omitted it in their declarative Project.

Hence it being obvious to the Swedish Ambassadors, what a viper was here hatching, they did demonstrate to the Danes

at several meetings, how necessary and behoofful it was not to omit that Article, for that it might be a means to prevent all indirect craft, which might be working in future times by the various interpretations upon that third point of the Treaty at *Roskild*: however that it was absolutely necessary, that his Majesty of *Sweden* should be most clearly certified of the Danes sincerity and true meaning towards him; neither was it a thing new and unheard of in matters of so great a moment, that though they seem clearly fet down, yet they should have the most plain and particular explication,

*Nor that the
explication
of the words
of the third
Article of the
Treaty at
Roskild
should be
made a
secret Arti-
cle,*

that nothing be left to subtle wits to wreat and abuse. But if they only stuck at the suspicion that might arise amongst people of other Nations, there were divers ways to remove that scruple. For that matter might either be comprehended in some secret Article, or that verball exposition of the Danish Commissioners might by their consent be inserted into the Protocoll or Registry, and subscribed by each party for future information, that it might be impossible hereafter to raise any doubt of the genuine sense of the Article, or of the meaning of those that made it. But as they did only make use of the suspicion of other Nations, to hinder the dispatch of the affairs; so that, which the Swedes propounded, could not possibly be acceptable to the Danes. For how, say they, can that be kept secret, to which not only two Kings, but the Senators of both the Kingdoms with many others are privy. And further they said they had no such Instructions from their King, and were already satisfied that they should never be commissioned to draw up any secret Article with the Swedes to that purpose. At length being urg'd with great instance by the Swedes, they did consent that that verball explication concerning the

genuine sense of the third Article of the Treaty at *Roskild* should be noted in due form in the Protocoll or Registry,

*Or brought
into a
particular
Recefs.*

only to that purpose, that it might afterwards be omitted in the peculiar Receffe.

Wherefore the Swedish Ambassadors being duly mindfull that the Danes had formerly taken the boldness to disparage the Authority of the Protocol at *Roskild*, reputing it only a private Writing, and such as could carry no plenary proof;

they saw there was little force and security in that concession of the Danes, yea no more, then was in their bare verbal Declaration. For it was to be fear'd, that they would hereafter, as formerly, deny that that Annotation was made in the Protocol by their consent and privity, chiefly, because there was none present of their party that was appointed to perfect the Protocol,

*Or subscribed
in a
Protocoll,*

as hath formerly been said. Therefore it was thought necessary that both the Swedish and Danish Commissioners should seal and subscribe this part of the Protocol. And so it was propounded to the Danes, who only deluded the Swedes, and rejected them in this demand,

*Prerending
sometimes
want of
Commission.*

using recourse to their old Plea of wanting Commission. At last, when after much hot contention, the Swedish Ambassadors could not be prevail'd withal by such frivolous excuses, they put off the victor, and were forc'd to discover, what they had rather have reserv'd in their breasts till a more commodious time, to wit, that they could in no wayes approve the Swedes Project in reference to the Baltick Sea;

*But at last
discover their
purpose was*

*not to
condescend
to the ex-
clusion of
forreign men
of War from
the Baltick
Sea.*

that that said Project did not faithfully explain the Agreements at *Roskild*, to which they were resolv'd to stick; that it would not be in their power to alter any word or tittle in those things, which both Kings together with the Senate of either Kingdom had ratified. Furthermore that it would be very absurd in them to bind themselves to the excluding of all Forreign Fleets whatsoever from the Baltick Sea, whereas by force of the Agreements at *Roskild*, they were oblig'd onely to the excluding of such Fleets as should come with Hostility, not those which should come either to convoy Merchants ships, or to relieve their friends, or else to transport Ambassadors and other publique Ministers from place to place.

The Swedish Commissioners had just cause to wonder at this had they not made sufficient proof before that the Danes dealt not clearly in this Treaty, and that their words and thoughts were far different: yet they could never have had imagined, that the Danes should have the boldness publicly to utter that which hitherto by reason of the apparent foulness thereof they had sought to palliate and dissemble by so many farfetch'd colours and glosses. For, as we have above-noted,

namely

the Danish Commissioners had formerly affirm'd in precise words,

*Contrary to
former tran-
actions,*

that they did maintain and hold the same Exposition that the Swedish Project did, concerning the third Article; neither had they refused that the Exposition they declared should for the greater certainty be set down in the Protocol or Registry: nay, what is more, in their drawing up of the League to be made with the Swedes, being a second time exhibited in writing, they held forth the said third Article in the very same form; so that they could not deny it now without horrible impudence, especially since those Danish Commissioners,

*and express
Declarations
at the Treaty
at Roskild.*

who were present at the Treaties at *Roskild*, did readily affirm, that a Foreign and Hostile Fleet in this case were Synonymous, and of the same import.

Besides, to speak the truth, as the right of Convoying hath its original from the right of the Superiority of the Territories, and no one ought justly to convoy any one through the territories of another; so no one can justly exercise that Right in the Baltick Sea, which hath been by general consent of all the Borderers on that Sea, time out of mind,

And the acknowledged Privileges of both Kingdoms.

and without any interruption, under the tuition and custody of these two Northern Kingdoms only. Yea, the States General themselves in all their Leagues entered into with the Kingdom of Sweden, do acknowledge their Dominion in the Baltick Sea, never adjudging it from that Kingdom.

And how, pray, is it possible, that any one should afflict another, who is an enemy to either one of these Kings, and not be accounted an enemy in doing it? Or who yet ever grew to that height of madness, to say, that any thing was altered, because it is declar'd in more words the better to explain it? Surely the Danes were possess'd with a new principle of Religion, that they could not with safety of conscience put an interpretation on that now, which a few days ago they presum'd wholly to deny, or at least to lessen much. Yet at last they came thus near the mark, that a Foreign Fleet of War should be prohibited from coming into the Baltick Sea, but that passage should not be denied to so many ships of War as did not make up a Fleet, which are sent to transport Ambassadors, or do any offices of the like nature.

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When therefore they had fhew'd the Danes at large,

*But the King
of Sweden
infifting refo-
lutely upon
former
agreements,*

how unjuftly they proceeded in this and in many other bufineffes, and withall in exprefs words added this threatening Language, that it was to be fear'd, that his Sacred Royal Majefty of Sweden perceiving too evidently that the Danes would not yield to thofe Agreements at *Roskild*, and that in a matter and Article of fo great moment, would endeavour to procure his fecurity fome other way, fince he could not obtain it, as it now appears by Treaties and Compofitions in writing. At laft the Danifh Commiffioners, and principally the high Steward *Joachim Gerfdorff*,

*At laft
condescend
thereunto,
but not till
the Moneth
of July, after
the Treaty at
Rofkild.*

but not until the Moneth of *July*, declar'd themfelves, that they did in all things approve of, and were well pleas'd with the Swedifh Project in this bufinefs; and that they were willing to exhibite that point engrofs'd in writing, a thing, which though they were often urg'd to, they never yet performed.

In the mean time whilft thefe things are in agitation at *Copenhagen*,

*In the
interim news
comes of
the
preparation
of a great
Fleet at the
follicitation
of the Polifh
and Bran-
denburghs
publique Mi-
nifters Letter*

X.

news was brought that there was a Fleet preparing in *Holland* to be sent forthwith, as the report went, into the Baltick Sea. That which encreas'd the rumor, was, that there was an Envoy from the King of *Poland* negotiating with the States of *Holland*, and also a Minister of *Brandenburgh* then Resident at the *Hague*, who implor'd their aid by Sea, Letter X. in the name of his Master the Elector, who was much afraid of the Swede. Hence the Ambassadors of *Sweden*, according to the command of his Majesty, thought it fitting for them to acquaint the Danish Commissioners with it, and to desire them to make ready some ships, and if there were occasion, to join with the Swedes in stopping the passage of a Foreign Fleet. His Sacred Royal Majesty of Sweden signified the same to them first himself,

*Whereof notice is given
to the Danes
by the King,
and by
Count
Wrangel,*

and then gave command that it should be done at *Gottorp* to *Owen Juul* the Danish Ambassador, and after that Count *Wrangel* high Admiral of the Kingdom declar'd it again in discourse with *Ulrick Christian Gyldenlowe* Lieutenant General of the Horse to the King of *Denmark*, in these express words,

*That a Fleet
might be
made ready
to guard the
Sound.*

that he would not stir thence with his Army, till they had given satisfaction according to the Agreements at *Roskild*, in that particular. Then the Danes were very large

[Pause]

in expressing their want and disability;

*But the
Danes
pretend in
ability to set
out a Fleet.*

and that by reason of the War, they were lately engag'd in, they were

reduced to such traits and extremity, that it was to no purpose to desire any such thing of them. His most Serene Majesty therefore, that he might not seem to demand Impossibilities of them, requir'd by his Ambassadors that they would only give out, that they made ready their whole Fleet, but indeed only fit out eight ships for the service, which together with the Swedish Fleet consisting of forty ships, might be able without any great difficulty to keep out a Foreign Fleet.

*Whereupon
the Swedes
desire but
eight ships to
joyn with
their Fleet.*

But the Danish Commissioners complain'd of their want of ability to do this too, never remembering that in their own Project of a League, they had already of their own accord offered to set out ten ships. Every man therefore may see, how vain and false this pretence was, in that they had every thing in great abundance,

*Which the
Danes also
refuse to do.*

which was requisite for the furnishing of eight ships. For there was no want of ships nor other necessaries, as guns, sails, anchors, ropes, and other such kinde of provision.

*Notwithstanding
their
sufficient
ability to do
it.*

They had store of Mariners too, and victuals, of which they had already brought to *Copenhagen*, or might have brought a large supply from the Castle of *Bahus* and the fortified places of *Schonen*. But they would not hear in that ear, and made their whole pretence nothing but so many Impossibilities.

At last to avoid their making ready a Fleet, the Danish Commissioners said,

*Promising to
prevail with
the States
General not*

*to fend any
Fleet to the
Baltick Sea.
Letter Y.*

that they would prevail with the States General, that no Fleet should be made ready there to fend into the Baltick Sea. But with what candor and fidelity they perform'd it, the Letters of *Beuningen*, Letter Y. written upon that subject will sufficiently declare. For they were so far from endeavouring to hinder it, that they affirm'd to the aforefaid *Beuningen*, that they had wholly refus'd the Declaration of the third Article at *Roskild*, and the joyning of their ships with the Swedes, which would admit that Article,

*Although to
Beuningen
they declare
the contrary.*

and that the Swedish Commissioners rested content with that Declaration; and all this out of no other intention, but the more to provoke the Hollanders to make ready their Fleet. Yet it is very remarkable that afterwards, that they might not seem to do nothing, they went about the fitting of one Man of War, but

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whether to mischief and spoil the Swede, or to side with them no body knows. For it were a strange vanity, to expect fidelity in them, who never had so much as a will to keep their promises.

There was as sharp a dispute too about the Island *Ween*;

*A sharp dis-
pute doth
arise
concerning
the
Dominion of
the Island of
Ween.
Letter Z.
Letter AA.
Letter BB.*

for when his Sacred Royall Majesty of *Sweden* had summoned the Inhabitants by his Commissioners to come with the rest of the people of *Schonen*, to take an Oath of Allegiance to him, they received contre-command from the King of *Denmark*, Letter Z. and so obey'd it not, though they were summon'd a second time, Letter A. A. as the Relation of the Lords

Commiſſioners in *Schonen* unfolds it at large, Letter *B.B.*

For this reaſon the Swediſh Ambaſſadours then Reſident at *Copenhagen* did at large, and with much pains, demonſtrate the injuſtice of that action in the King of *Denmark*, and that the Iſland *Ween* belong'd to *Schonen*.

For it is a firm and undoubted Law among the more civiliz'd Nations,

*Proofs that it
belongs to
the Province
of Schonen.*

that all thoſe Iſlands, which make not particular Provinces of themſelves, are part of thoſe Provinces, to which they are next adjacent, unleſs it can plainly be prov'd either by contract or preſcription of the longeſt time that ſomething elſe was in force concerning the ſame. Now becauſe the Danes themſelves did not deny, that *Ween* was not a Province of it ſelf, it was preſum'd according to the Law of Nations, that it belongs to *Schonen*, to which it is next adjacent. Which preſumption of the Law being on the Swedes ſide, the proof of the contrary lay upon the Commiſſioners of *Denmark*.

Befides, the Iſland of *Ween* was ſtill liable to the ſame fortune with *Schonen*, not onely then, when it was given in pawn to the Counts of *Holftein*, and afterwards redeemed by the Swedes, and united to that Kingdom by the Danes conſent, Letter *C.C.D.D.* but alſo when it was reſtored again to *Denmark* by the King *Magnus Smech*.

Let. CC.DD.

Which doubtleſs had never fo fell out, had it not been part of *Schonen*.

Thirdly, if we give any credit to the Northern Hiſtorians, it is manifeſt enough that the ancient bounds of the Swedes and Gothes reach'd to the middle of the Sound. And upon this ground he challeng'd *Ween* as belonging to *Schonen*, in as

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much as there muſt be ſome reaſon for the determin'd middle of that Sea. Yea *Arnold Huithfeld* and *Iſaack Pontanus* do not deny that the ancient limits of *Sweden* and *Schonen* were agreed upon to be in the very Channell of the Sound, as their words taken out of the publique Inſtruments have it, Letter *E.E.* The credit of theſe men no Dane will dare to queſtion,

Letter EE.

in regard the one being Chancellour of the Kingdom of *Denmark* was both a great lover of his Countrey, and very much knowing in that Hiftory; the other being a Dane born too, was hired by hsi Nation to compofe the Annals of his Countrey, and publifhed that Work of his, collected out of the Records of the Kingdom, by the authority and at the charge of King *Chriftian* the Fourth. What will they fay, that in the Reign of *Chriftopher* the firft of *Denmark* long before *Schonen* was pawn'd to the Counts of *Holftein*, *Ween* was fubject to the Diocefs of *Lunden*, and received Laws and Commands from the Archbifhop there, under the quality of Bifhop of *Schonen*. Hence it is no wonder, that in all the alienations it went confiantly with *Schonen*, as we faid before. Yet fuppofe that *Ween* did not at firft belong to *Schonen*, yet it cannot be denied, that at that time when it was pawn'd and redeem'd, it was added to *Schonen* under the King *Magnus Smech*, and made parcell of it.

Fourthly, The Letters of the grant of *Schonen*,

Letter FF.

Letter *F F.* do in plain words affirm, that *Schonen* was granted to the King and Kingdom of *Sweden*, with all the Appurtenances that either now belong or ever heretofore have belonged to it. But the Ifland of *Ween* did, as to its fecular Jurifdiction, not onely at the time of the Grant (as the Conftitution of *Chriftian* the Fourth, Letter *GG. HH.* written in the Book of Records of *Schonen*, and the avoiding or revocation of it,

Let. GG.HH.
Letter II.

Letter *II.* by *Frederick* the Third now King of *Denmark*; at laft after a Peace was concluded, and when it could not then be well avoided, doth plainly enough fhew) belong to *Schonen*, but long before, when *Schonen* was fubject to *Sweden* (which time we are principally to obferve in this cafe) was united to that Province, and with the fame Province difunitied from the Kingdom of *Sweden*, as *Huithfeld*, *Pontanus*, and very many others plainly affirm.

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Fifthly, It can scarcely be denied, but that his Sacred Royal Majesty of *Sweden* did at least propose that to himself by the late Agreement, to restore to his own Country of *Sweden*, together with *Schonen*, whatsoever had been formerly with *Schonen* taken away from *Sweden*; especially that the ancient Bounds of *Sweden*, which were in the middle of the *Sound*, should revert to him again.

Sixthly, It is an Argument that the King of *Denmark* was willing for satisfaction to grant to his most Serene Majesty of *Sweden*, all that formerly with *Schonen* had been wrested from *Sweden*, in as much as when he granted away many other Provinces to *Sweden*, yet he reserv'd not in express words the Island of *Ween* to himself and the Kingdom of *Denmark*.

Besides, the Author of the Book written in the Danish Language, and entituled, *Danmarks oc Norgis fructbar Herlighed*, or *The fruitful Dominion of Denmark and Norway*, doth plainly confess, that *Ween* doth properly belong to *Schonen*, unless by special Privilege and Grant from the King, something be constituted to the contrary.

The Danish Commissioners were not a little employed to put a face of Justice upon their denial of it;

*Which the
Danes seek
to avoid.*

but they did chiefly endeavour to persuade the Gentlemen, that were Mediatours, that the Demand of the Swedes was wholly unjust; and that there never was any one, that had the boldness to deny, that *Ween* was part of *Sealan*. They exhibited the causes of this their assertion in writing, Letter KK. and to put the fairer cheat on them,

Letter KK.

divided them into two Classes, of which the first should prove, that *Ween* was not granted to *Sweden*, the latter that it was a part of *Sealand*.

But now as to what concerns the first Argument,

*By some Ar-
guments,
which the
Swedish
answer.*

that that Ifland was exprefly named and demanded at *Wordinburgh* in fatisfaction by the Swedifh Commiffioners, but at *Tofttrup* and *Roskild* was omitted and pafs'd by in filence, and therefore that it was laid afide, that truly makes little to the purpofe. For *Ween* indeed was by name demanded at *Wordinburgh*,

*The firft Ar-
gument of
the firft
Claffis.*

as alfo *Saltholm*, *Anholt*, *Leffow*, *Bornholm*, &c. together with *Schonen*, *Halland*, and *Blecking*, but without that claufe, *With all the Appurtenances*, which the Swedifh Commiffioners therefore

[Pargent]

counted fuperfluous, becaufe at that time they were perfwaded, that all the Appurtenances of thofe provinces were reckoned in thofe Iflands, by reafon they did not exactly know whether *Saltholm* did not belong to *Schonen* as well as *Ween*, and were in a doubt whether *Anholt* and *Leffow* were parts of *Halland*. But when afterwards it appear'd very certainly to them, that *Ween* was part of *Schonen*, and that it was to be fear'd that there were yet more Iflands appertenant to it, whofe names they knew not, the Swedifh Commiffioners thought it not fo neceffary to exprefs any Iflands fpecifically at *Tofttrup* and *Roskild*, but rather to comprehend them all in that generall claufe, *with all the Appurtenances*, left by naming more Iflands, they fhould prejudice themfelves in others belonging to the Provinces that were to be furrendred, the names of which at that time they were not acquainted with; and give the Danes an occafion by infering of one to collect that the other was excluded, and upon that ground to deny that *Hitteroon*, and other fuch like Iflands, do belong to the Coafts of *Trundheim*, becaufe they were not exprefly named.

Befides, it being fuppofed, that at that time, to wit, in the firft Project, (though there was never any fuch thing) *Ween* was demanded as a thing apart and feparate from *Sealand*, yet you cannot thence infer, that it is not comprehended under the generall claufe of Appertenances; if we can, as it may be eafily done, make out that it either doth at this time belong to *Schonen*, or formerly did belong to it. Thirdly, it is a common Maxime. That a fuperfluous claufe doth neither good nor hurt.

Laftly, no man can without manifelt injury to the truth affirm, that the Danes did exprefly referve the Ifland *Ween* to themfelves, in that they made Anfwer to the firft Project, that they could not agree to that fatisfaction, in which *Ween* was exprefly named, becaufe at that very fame time they would not

agree to give *Bornholm*, and the Dominion of *Bahufe* and *Trundheim* in satisfaction, which Provinces and Dominions nevertheless they afterward granted together with *Schonen*, *Halland* and *Blecking* with all their appertenances.

The other Argument of the first Claffe, to wit, that the most

Illustrious

Serene his Majesty of *Sweden* did not demand the Island *Ween*,

*The second
argument of
the first
Claffe.*

till after the time of the Surrendry of *Schonen* was expired, and after the Swedish Commissioners had had possession of all *Schonen* with its appertenances, and that *Ween* was without controverſie and contradiction left to the Danes, is much like the former. For all circumstances being well considered, the contrary will plainly appear, and first in that, as soon as the places of defence in a Province are once given in possession, all Countrey Villages and Parishes, which belong to that Province, are accounted to be at the same time given in possession, which very thing also was made before the delivery of the ratification. Besides, the Swedish Commissioners summoned the Inhabitants of *Ween* together with those of *Schonen*, to perform Homage, and take an Oath of Fealty: which when they were not then present to do, and gave no answer to the Letters that were sent thither to that purpose, then his Sacred Royall Majesty of *Sweden*, after it came to his knowledge, was pleased to enjoin his Ambassadors then resident at *Copenhagen*, to shew what right they had to that Island, and to make demand of it from the Danes, that so the Inhabitants of *Ween* might be reduced without any further circumstances: this also he gave Order to his Deputies to signify to *Owen Juul* Ambassador of his Majesty of *Denmark* at *Gottenburgh*. For to have made mention of this before, had been altogether unreasonable, and to no more purpose, then if we should treat about the right of *Sweden*, to some Islands of Norway that are granted to it; before the Inhabitants thereof or any other should start any doubt about it. Lastly his most Sacred Royal Majesty of *Sweden* could not destroy his right, in that he did not presently at the very beginning take possession of the Island; for it is sufficient in Law, if any one upon better information of what his right is then before he had, shall challenge it before the time of the enjoyment of it be ended. As if in case it had hapned, that in the grant of the Dominions of *Trundheim* and *Bahufe* some of the Appertenances thereunto had been conceal'd by the Danes, which the Swedish Ministers and Commissioners

being not very well skill'd in those places, had not presently demanded, this would not at all hinder, but that they in process of

[Pause]

time being better inform'd of the places belonging to it, and instructed with fit instruments, might claim that to themselves which had formerly been fraudulently concealed. Because the fraud of the Concealer doth in no wise damage the appurtenances of him that deals justly, nor hinder him upon better information of what is his right, from demanding those things which were given him by Grant. And thus much for the Arguments of the first Clause.

For as to what concerns the latter, which should prove that *Ween* is a part of *Sealand*, this is the first,

*The second
Clause, the
first
argument.*

that that Island was both as to its Secular and Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction, at all times subject to *Sealand*. But how true it is, doth easily appear from what hath been said before. For we shew'd there, that that Island belong'd to Schnonen, not only in that time when it was pawn'd to the Counts of *Holftein*, but by a later Grant. For those Letters of *Christian* the Fourth, which are alledg'd to testify this, make nothing in the case; for he that looks upon them but superficially may perceive the contrary, and that it was for a peculiar reason, that it did at sometimes submit to the Provincial power of *Sealand*. But that *Ween* hath been formerly subject to the Bishop of *Sealand*, makes it no more a part of *Sealand*, than *Falstrel*, *Laland*, *Langland*, and part of *Alfen*, which at this day are under the Jurisdiction of the Bishop of *Odensea*, are by reason of that, parts of *Fuhnen*. The very Kingdoms of *Sweden* and *Denmark* themselves were formerly under the Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction of the Bishop of *Hamburgh*, which nevertheless had no other dependency from it.

The second Argument of the Danes is,

*The second
argument.*

that those of *Ween* use the same Language and Dialect with those of *Sealand*. But no one is so blind, as that he cannot see the weakness of this Argument. If all the Inhabitants of *Amack*, as a part of them doth, should speak the Dutch Language, yet no body, by the Danes good leave, would

conclude that therefore Amack is under the Government of Holland. So all the Inhabitants of the Ifland of Nockoe, onely of all Eaftland, fpeak the Swe-difh Language, yet doubtlefs that Ifland is a part of Eaftland. He muft be ignorant of all Antiquity, to fay no worfe, that

doth not apprehend fuch things come to pafs by the tranfporting of Colonies. Hence indeed we might without much difficulty grant, that fome of Sealand have inhabited that Ifland, but he that would thence collect, that that Ifland it felf belongs to Sealand, muft have his brains in his heels. As if it might not be too, that by reaſon of the often commerce with the Citizens of Copenhagen, the Inhabitants of Ween might frame themſelves to fpeak the Language of Sealand, when as every week they ufe to go thither.

The third Argument,

*The third ar-
gument.*

whereon the Danes lay their main ftrefs, is of the fame force and fubftance, to wit, that the people of Ween hold their Land by Villanage, and ufe the fame Law with thofe of Sealand. For to begin with the latter, as it doth not follow, becauſe Fuhnen, Langland, and Laland ufe the Law of Jutland; the Cities Stralfand, Roftock, Gryphifwald, &c. the Law of Lubeck; Stetin that of Magdeburgh; Poland in many points that of Saxony; that therefore theſe places fhall belong to Jutland, Lubeck, Magdeburgh, or Saxony: fo neither can we conclude that Ween is appurtenant to Sealand, becauſe it ufeth the Law of Sealand. And it is frange that the Danes fhould feek to conclude from the Laws and Cuſtoms of any Province, to whom that Province doth belong, whereas by force of the Treaty at Roſkild, Schonon, Halland, and Blecking Provinces granted to the Swedes, are by ſpecial Agreement to enjoy for the future the Daniſh Laws, notwithstanding they are for ever annex'd and united to the Kingdom of Sweden.

But as to the former, that that ſubjection of thofe of Ween, to wit, the holding of their Land by Villanage, is a thing peculiar onely to Sealand of all the Daniſh provinces; and that Sealand with the places appertinent to it, is as it were ſpecifically diſtinguiſh'd from all the other Territories of Denmark, we know not whether it deſerves better indignation or laughter. For if it be a ſhame for a Citizen to be ignorant of the Laws of his Countrey, we can ſcarce finde how the Daniſh Commiſſioners fhould acquit themſelves of a foul fault, who are not aſham'd to declare thofe things upon a Publique account, which the meanest of the Commonalty know to be moſt

[Page]

falſe. Are not thoſe of Laland Tenants alſo by Villenage, in ſo much that the very Clergy were heretofore ſubject to that burthen, as *Stephanius* in his Hiſtory of *Chriſtian* the Third plainly confeſſeth; not a little decrying the King, for that he diſcharg'd them of that ſervice. But what ſhall we ſay of Amack, where the people are not bound to Villenage, but free Denizons? For either this muſt be no longer part of Sealand, or Laland muſt be appertinent to Sealand; neither of which the Danes either can or will acknowledge. But it becomes him, who hath once abandoned ſhame, to be impudent with a miſchief, eſpecially where thoſe that baulk the truth may hope for a reward.

Their laſt reaſon was fetch'd from Authorities,

*The fourth
argument.*

for that all Writers, both Ancient and Modern, do comprehend Ween under the deſcription of Sealand. That the Daniſh Commiſſioners might gain credit to this aſſertion, they ſent to Monſieur *Terlon's* lodging, Ambaſſadour of the French King, and one of the Mediators, a whole pile of Books, from whence it might be diſcovered, that Ween did belong to Sealand and not to Schonen. But the cover was fit for the diſh, and the Cauſe was not ſo bad, but the Witneſſes were worſe. For who would have dream'd that the Danes ſhould carry themſelves ſo careleſly in an affair of ſo great moment; and for the clearing of the controverſie, whether Ween did belong to Sealand or Schonen, ſhould produce thoſe for witneſſes, who are not Danes by birth, nor knowing in the Hiſtory of Denmark, and ſo might accurately decide the matter, but foreigners and ſtrangers, ſuch as could claim no credit at all in the Affairs of thoſe Northern Nations, nor have deſcrib'd the ſtate of thoſe Kingdoms with due diligence or previous enquiry, but have ſcrib'd without choice or judgement, what ever they could finde in other Writers. That this may manifeſtly appear, let us examine that Author, who exceeds all the reſt in bulk and error, *Atlas major Joannis Janſſonii de Anno 1664.* and we ſhall perceive how dim-lighted the Danes were in citing him. For he in his deſcription of Denmark affirms, that Jutland is divided into Northern and Southern, of which the latter hath anciently been call'd Nordalbingen, and containeth the Dukedom of Sleſwick,

Item.

to which alſo Holſtein is ſubject. But who is ſo ignorant of theſe places, as not to diſcern this to be moſt groſſly falſe, forasmuch as Holſtein is no part of Denmark, nor *in ſpecie* of the Dukedom of Sleſwick, but a part of Germany and feudary to the Roman Empire, and is held of the King of Denmark onely under the title of Duke. Nor is that a ſmall errour, that he reckons Store a River of Holſtein amongſt the Rivers of the Kingdom of Denmark. Thirdly,

having spoken of the Sound, he adds this, that even there, to wit, near that Strait, Roskild is situated; manifestly contrary to the truth, since that City lies about eight German miles distant from thence. Fourthly, discoursing of the Islands adjacent to Sealand, he affirms that Monen contains Stege, and other Cities, where as there is no other City there to be found. Fifthly, he affirms that Schonen hath been usually divided into two Dutchies, Halland and Blecking, a thing which the Danes themselves will acknowledge to be false.

Sixthly, concerning the present and modern Estate he affirms, that in Lunden of Schonen is an Archbishop's Sea, whereas it is only a Bishoprick and no more. Seventhly, which is a most notorious dotage in him, or rather foolishness, he makes Malmoe, usually called by the Flemings Elmbegn, to be two Towns, which is only one Town with two names. Just as if a man should affirm, that Gedanum were a Town different from Dantzick, Sedin from Stetin, Regiomont from Konigsberg, and Bigosce from Bromberg. Eighthly, he makes Halland and Blecking to be appertinent to Schonen, which are Provinces independent, though in matters Ecclesiastical subject to one Bishop. Ninthly, he sets down the Islands Sando, Hanno, and Bornholm, belonging to Schonen, of which the latter is a distinct Province of itself, seated under the Diocese of Lunden. Tenthly, in his description of Jutland, Letter AA.

Letter AA.

the Author reports that the Bishoprick of Sleswick was always in the possession of the Dukes, and always subject to the Kingdom of Denmark. The falseness of which, the Delegates lately sent to Copenhagen by the most Serene *Frederick* Duke of Holstein did at large demonstrate. Eleventhly in his description of Fuhnen,

Letter BB.

Letter BB. he saith, that Fuhnen is divided

(Pauze)

from Denmark by the strait of Middlefact, as if Fuhnen also were not Denmark, and only Jutland went by the name of Denmark. Twelfthly, he writes that Fuhnen contains in it ninety Islands, amongst which he counts Laland, Falstere, Alsen, and others, which are particular Provinces of themselves, and do no otherwise belong to Fuhnen, then that in matters spiritual they are under the Bishop of Odensea. Nay, Alsen and Aroe do rather depend of the Dukedom of Sleswick. But for those ninety Islands, we shall have need of another *Columbus* to discover them Thirteenthly, In his description of Norway he affirms, that Marstrand is a Peninsula; a falsehood that is obvious to every one. Fourteenthly, In his description of Sweden he

would have Ingermanland to be feated on one fide of Capor, when as Capor is a city of Ingermanland. Thefe Abfurdities amongft many thoufand others we onely inferted, to fhew what fmall credit, or indeed that no credit at all is to be given to this grand Witnefs, the Danes produc'd, in thefe Northern Affairs.

That French Book is much alike too, that is entituled, *Defcription General d' Europe Quatriefme partie du Monde, par Pierre d' Avity, imprimè à Paris Anno, 1643.* in fol. For he in that defcription of his, cites in the Margent thofe very fame Authors, which *Janffonius* in his *Atlas* puts down that he made ufe of, and therefore deferves no greater credit then the other. But, to pafs over thofe errors, which he commits very often in his defcription of Schonen, by imitating the *Atlas*, what ever concerns this bufinefs, makes Ween no more a part of Sealand, then Langland, Laland, Falftre, Alfén, Aroe, &c. parts of Fuhnen.

Nor in this cafe is the other French Book of any weight, entituled, *Les Empires, Royaumes, Eftats, Seigneries, &c. par le Sieur D V. J. Y. imprimè à S. Omer, 1614.* in quarto. For it is not onely ftuff'd with the Errors that are in the *Atlas*, but hath fo many more befides that any one may eafily fee he was a faithful Collector of others too.

Lewis Gothofred in his *Archontologia Cofmica*, and *Martin Zeiler* in his *Defcription of Denmark*, run into the fame error; the latter of which, having no foundation to go on, fails moft

groffly,

not onely in counting Hallands-As, a montanous wood of that name, amongft the Maritime Towns of Halland; but alfo in putting Trelleburgh Ufted, Santhammer, Ahufe, Sylfsburg, &c. amongft the Maritimes Cities of Blecking; when as indeed onely that, he fet laft, belongs to that place, all the reft being adjacent to Schonen.

As to what concerns *Heylin's* Cofmography in Englifh, that faith indeed that the Ifland Ween, amongft other Provinces, is fubject to the Government of Sealand: but by that word Government, he underftands onely Ecclefiaftical Jurifdiction; as he writes that Laland, Langland, Falftre, Arroë, &c. are fubject to the Government of Fuhnen, becaufe the Bifhop of Odenfea, as to matters Spiritual, governs there; but for what belongs to fecular Jurifdiction, by the Danes own confeffion, it hath dependance upon no other; and the Author himfelf affirms, that Alfén and Arroë are parts of the Dukedom of Slefwick. But though that Englifh Hiftorian ftumbled not at this ftone, yet to pafs by other things, he betrayes his ignorance in the Affairs of thefe Northern parts, in that he faith, that the Ifland of Bornholm was fo called

from a City of the same name; a place which no man yet could ever find there.

The Rere was brought up by two Danish Books, of which the former cited before, entitled, *Danmarks oc Norgis fructbar Herlighed*, the other *Encomium Daniae*; but they had better have pass'd them by, unless it had made more for the honour of their Nation. For the former in this takes the Swedes part, and writes in express words, that Ween, as to the secular Jurisdiction, belongs to Schonen, unless the King in favour to one or other constitutes something to the contrary: and the other makes Ween to be in the Bishopricks of Sealand, which, as it makes not for the Danes, so the Swedes do not deny it.

These are the Arguments which the Danes would have prove that Ween doth belong to Sealand, which we have here laid down, that the World may see with what strength and resolution they maintain their Cause.

*A Reply to
the Danish
Answers to
the Swedish
Arguments.*

Notwithstanding the Danish Commissioners were thus worsted, they were not discouraged, but brought their whole strength and force to overthrow the Swedes Arguments, by

excepting to the first;

To the first.

that the Islands Jarvey and Garnvey are bordering nearer upon Normandy than England, and yet they do belong to England. But that case is quite another thing than ours, for those Islands are Provinces of themselves; besides they were formerly appertinances to Normandy, but when that Countrey was in the hands of the French, those Islands were united to the Kingdom of England upon a particular agreement. But seeing there can be no such agreement produced concerning Ween, the Rule of the Law of Nations stands in full force and virtue.

That which they excepted against the second argument,

*To the
second.*

that Halland and Blecking were alwayes alienated as Schonen was, and yet are never the more parts of Schonen, is not true. For we know that Halland hath fometimes been pawn'd *in ſpecie*, and by it ſelf, and fometimes too hath been under the ſubjection of the Swedes, when Schonen at the ſame time hath paid Allegiance to Denmark; the latter of which, the body of the Law of Sweden doth clearly witneſs. Now grant it be ſo, yet the caſe of Halland and Blecking is far different from this, for they are independent Provinces, and were never alienated as parts of another, as Ween was. Nay, though you ſhould reply, that Ween was ſo alienated with Schonen, and not as an appertinent to it, in regard Ween is ſpecifically and by name expreſs'd in the publique Inſtrument, made in the time of King *Magnus*, concerning the ſurrendry of Schonen, yet it will not at all advantage you: Inſomuch as in the very ſame Inſtrument Lyftre is alſo named ſpecifically, which nevertheleſs without all controverſie, and by the aſſent of the Danes themſelves was a part of Blecking, and now ſurrendred to Sweden with Blecking. And that naming of them in particular was onely for the greater caution, and more then neceſſary, which kinde of Clauſes whether they be put in or left out do no harm.

Happily theſe two places were therefore ſpecially named, becauſe at that time Lyftre was the moſt conſiderable Port of Blecking, and Ween defended the Port of Landſcron.

Therefore when this way would not take, the Daniſh Commiſſioners

Propoſed
tried another,

*The Danes
would have
the
Controverſie
about Ween
remitted to
arbitrators,
but the
Swedes give
reaſon why
that ought
not to be.*

and would have this controverſie put to the judgement of Arbitrators, to whoſe award according to the agreements at Stetin, ſuch contentions, as aroſe of that kinde, uſe to be referred. But that is not the meaning of the Agreements at Stetin, for they do not ſubmit thoſe things, which belong to the execution of a Peace made to arbitration, but onely thoſe controverſies,

which is times of Peace might happily arise between those Northern Kingdoms. But this contention of Ween not coming into that number and account, there is no reason why it should be bound up by the form of those Agreements at Stetin. Besides, the Swedes easily melted out; that the Danes did desire it to be put to arbitration for no other end, but by their several delays to continue the controversy to eternity, or at least protract it for a long time, as we see it happened in those Differences in the Agreements of Stetin referred to Arbitrators, which after forty years and upward, to wit, in the thirteenth year of this Age, were buried, and utterly extirpated in the transaction of Siored. This was the reason why they desired the controversy might be decided without any further circumstances, adding some kind of threats too, in case they should little or nothing prevail with them with Reasons and Arguments how efficacious soever. Yet, lest the Danes should have any just cause of complaint, the Swedes were willing to acquiesce; and would forbear to urge any further the surrender of the Island, so that they would make it appear, that the Island Ween was by publique Constitution joyned for ever to Sealand, before the Peace made at Roskild, or by the Rolls or Dooms-day Book of the Kingdom, that it was still without any interruption adherent to Sealand. But the Danes produced not a title to that purpose, pretending that those Rolls had been made use of and burnt, to make Fireworks at the Marriage of Prince *Christian* the Fifth. At length after the most Serene his Majesty of Denmark had himself made search into the Records and Evidences of his Kingdom, and could find nothing that could entitle Ween to Sealand, made an agreement with the French Ambassador, who (by reason the English Envoy extraordinary, during that controversy, was

Went gone to Copenhagen) was much employed in that Affair, that the Island Ween so often made mention of,

*At last the
Danes
promise to
grant Ween
to the
Swedes, but
in a deceit-
ful way.*

should be surrendered as a part adherent to Schonen, and that Letters should with all possible speed, that could be, be delivered to the Ambassadors of Sweden, by virtue of which the Inhabitants of Ween should be passed over and granted to Schonen, and the Kingdom of Sweden. But when the Danish Commissioners afterwards put this Article upon that controversy into writing,

they put the words thus; That Ween was granted to the Swedes, but not as part of Schonen, but onely to avoid enmities, and over and above; onely for this purpose, to leave themselves an occasion hereafter to demand it again. Juft so it was with the Letters they promised us, we could not get them of them, the Danes still complaining, as often as we minded them of it, which was very often, that we should have them after the Treaty was ended, having no regard that Ween was demanded and granted, not by force of the present Treaty, but of the Agreements at Roskild, and that it was immediately subject to the Jurisdiction of Sweden with Schonen, to which it belonged. But it is in vain to contend with them by reasons, who never resolv'd of any thing less, then to perform their promises. For whilst the Swedish Ambassadors expect the Danes Letters of surrender, the King of Denmark himself enjoyns his Resident in England,

Let. LL. MM.

Letter LL. MM. that he would use his endeavour to take an occasion to persuade his Highness the Lord Protector of England, that the Island Ween was wrested from them very wrongfully; yet that he should be very wary in his proceed, lest the Swedish Ministers Resident there should perceive any thing of it. So well indeed the Danes with the Swedes, that they endeavour to render them odious to the whole World with false accusations and detractions.

Nay, the perverseness and wilfulness of the Danes reach'd into Norway, and the very borders of the North.

*The like
deceit and
perverseness
used about
the surrender
of Rumsdhal
in the Juris-
diction of
Trundheim.*

For whereas the Jurisdiction of Nidroes, which commonly goes by the name of Trundheim, ought to be surrendered to the Swedes, Rumsdhal a little Lordship there, always adjoynd to the Jurisdiction of Trundheim, and which the Danish Commissioners

themselves at Roskild confess'd to be a part of it, was held out, and denied us by Wibe Governour of Trundheim. Indeed when the Swedish Ambassadors first acquainted the Danish Commissioners with it, they would not

believe, that the Governour dar'd do any fuch thing, but when it appear'd to them, that the matter was really fo, they made as if he did it meerly of his own head. But he that fhall but curforily look over the Copy of the Commiffion, that he withheld it by, which the Danes at the inftance of the Swedes fhew'd at laft in July, will eafily perceive, that the Governor attempted it not without command.

Letter NN.

Letter NN.

It will be worth while, to obferve here a little at large the horrible villany of the Danes, that fhew'd it felf in this bufinefs. For when the queftion at Roskild about the furrendry of the Jurifdiction of Trundheim in fatisfaction to the Swedes, was, what ought to come under that denomination, both fides at laft agreed on this,

*As
appeareth
by the
Swedifh
Protocol.*

That by the Jurifdiction of Trundheim, all that is underftood to be granted to the Swedes, that belongs to the Bifhoprick of Trundheim, unlefs what exprefly belongs to the Jurifdiction of Norland fpecifically fo called, and Wardhufe, as the words of the Swedifh Protocol have it. And to avoid all doubts, that might be raifed on this bufinefs, one of the Swedifh Minifters dictated the very fame words to the Danifh Registers pen. But when the Swedifh Ambaffadors being led upon good and weighty grounds, and taking efpecial notice of the controverfie that was rais'd about Rumfdhall, would infer in writing that peculiar Article concerning the appertinances of the Jurifdiction of Trundheim, in a declarative Recefs, Letter OO,

Letter OO,

wherein, not onely all the places appertaining to it were fpecifically exprefs'd, but the above-cited words of the Protocol alledged; then the Danes began to prick up their ears, and that they might lay afide or fupprefs that Article, they pretended that it was to no purpofe to make any further controverfie about this bufinefs, and that there was no need of any fuch Declaration; befides, that they had given command to the Governor of Trundheim, that he fhould raife no doubts about the furrendry of that Lordfhip. Neverthelefs, when the Ambaffadors urg'd it, the Danifh Commiffioners anfwered,

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that their demand was new, and that there was no such thing in the words of the Protocol; that there never was any such kind of mention of the Bishopricks of Trundheim, and that there were some Goods comprehended under those words, neither belonging to the Jurisdiction of Norland specifically so called, nor Wardhupe, though lying in them, which were in no wise granted.

The Swedish Ambassadors were not a little moved with that answer, and the rather in that *Gerfard* High Steward of the Kingdom and others, which were present at the Treaties at Roskild, did both know and confess that those were the formal words, which were made use of. Hence to clear themselves of foul dealing, they desired a Copy of the Danish Protocol, making no question but they should find the same words there. Besides, *Cornelius Lerck* went to one of the Ambassadors, who had been Register at Roskild, and after discoursing several things about this business, said, that he did not remember, that it was concluded at Roskild, that all that which appertains to the Bishopricks of Trundheim, excepting that, which belongs to the Jurisdiction of Norland specifically so called, and Wardhupe, was granted with the Jurisdiction of Trundheim. But after when the Ambassador opened the Protocol, he found these words written: *By the Jurisdiction of Trundheim,*

*Compared
with the Da-
nish.*

all those things are understood to be granted, which appertain to that Jurisdiction, from which notwithstanding those are expressly excepted, that belong to the Jurisdiction of Norland and Wardhupe. Where a child may perceive a notorious tautologie, and so a great fault, unless one will make his business to be understandingly mad. For, pray, what kind of explication would that be: *By the Jurisdiction of Trundheim is understood all that, which appertains to that Jurisdiction:* truly, a very silly one, or rather none at all; or how can the Jurisdiction of Norland and Wardhupe be excepted from Trundheim, which never yet were comprehended under it? Whence it must necessarily follow, that the Bishopricks of Trundheim was mentioned, in that those two before-named Jurisdictions, excepted from the Grant, are subject to that Bishopricks. But by whose negligence or falseness it was, that in the place of Bishopricks, the word Jurisdiction

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was put into the Danish Protocol, is not proper now to enquire.

But what ever this be, though in the mean time, to wit, in July there was news come, that the Lordship of Rumsdhal was delivered up to the Swedes

Deputies; yet the Danes did not relish it well, that the Swedes Ambassadors should, as we said before, put in writing the Article concerning the appertinances of the Jurisdiction of Trundheim; and that for no other reason, but that they might have hereafter an occasion to complain, either that that Jurisdiction was granted by mistake, or wrested away by violence. As it fell out in the case of those two Parishes Idre and Jerne, into the possession of which the Danes put the Swedes; as also of Jemterland and Herndahlen after the Peace in the Year 1645, and yet they were not ashamed lately to alledge, the injustice of taking them away as the cause of their War. You may easily collect, that we were to expect the same dealing in this too, from the words of *Jonas Juul* Envoy of the King of Denmark into Poland, spoken at Berlin, where he did confidently assert, that the Danes might easily take an advantage from the controversy about Rumsdhal, to make a new War upon the Swedes. But we must proceed to greater matters yet.

For if ever there were any thing,

*Another
cause of
difference
was the Custom
which the Danes
used to take
of the ships
passing
through the
Sound, be-
longing to
Sweden.*

that for these seventy years and upwards hath embroil'd these neighboring people in a War, it was certainly that Custom that the Danes use to take of those ships that pass through the Sound, the burthen of which the Swedes would never yet submit to. *Denmark* hath had sufficient experience of that to their great loss, and especially in the War made in 1643. which was undertaken principally, because the Danes exacted Customs of the Swedes. But the Danes could never be so far mended by beating, as to deal more warily for the future.

For though by the fourth Article of the Transaction at Roskild it was agreed, that all the ships properly belonging to the Subjects of the Kingdom of Sweden, in what place soever they live,

*Contrary to
express*

*Agreements
at Roskild.*

so that they have with them their Passports, called commonly *Sea Briefs*, which use to mention the Owner of the ships, ought to remain free with all the Lading in them from

all Custom, Inquisition, Search, and other such kinde of troubles; they, which were the King of Denmarks Commissioners of the Customs in the Sound at Hellesborg took no notice of it at all, but not onely exacted Customs of the ships belonging to Stettin and Stralsund, and of other Merchandise properly belonging to the Subjects of the Kingdom of Sweden in Pomerania and Liefland, but detained some of those ships for some dayes time; inasmuch that onely in the month of May, as is well known, they broke this Priviledge eight times. Nay, the Danes were not allow'd to exact Customs of the Wines that were allotted for his Sacred Royal Majesty of Swedens Court, and his chief Ministers, as appears to have been done on the 16. day of May at Hellesborg. All which for brevity sake we will adde in their order to this work, Letter P P.

Letter P P.

But when the Ministers of Sweden objected to the Commissioners of the Danish Customs, that they had violated their Agreements; they answered, that they knew no other Agreements but those of Bromsebroe; nor had they received any command to let the Swedish ships pass upon any other terms then formerly. Which excuse, as they had often at other times made, they had the confidence to make yet again on the sixth day of July; to be silent of other breaches of the Articles of Bromsebroe, confirm'd at Roskild, which they committed in this business lately after the Peace was made. Indeed they made restitution of some of those things, they had wrongfully extorted,

*Which the
Danes took
no care to
put in
execution.*

but not of all, nor those neither until they were urg'd by the Swedish Ambassadors. But if the Danes had really intended to have stood to those Agreements at Roskild, they would have taken greater care in an Affair of that difficulty. Nevertheless, as if it had been a flight matter they had in hand, the Danish Senators never gave so much as a Copy of the Agreements at Roskild to the Commissioners of the Customs, or any other direction how

they should use the Swedes ships for the future; but left the whole business to some old crafty Custom-house Men, to the great injury both of the Swedes Honor, and the sacred observancy of Agreements. What could any one now expect of the Danes for the future, that dar'd to commit such kind of enormities, when the Swedish Army was yet in

the bowels of their Kingdom, and his Majesties Ambassadors staid at Copenhagen urging the conclusion of the Peace, and all those Articles were fresh in their memory, which were lately made at Copenhagen, upon weighing and considering of all circumstances; so that it is so much the more wonderful, that the Danes should be so negligent in ordering a matter of so great concernment. But it is probable that the Danes did it, in regard they were weary of the Transaction at Roskild, and so made it their business to render themselves guilty of the breach of it; and in case it should not fall out some other way, they persuaded themselves, that this business would at last tire out the Swedes patience. For there is much in the meaning of the words of *Peter Reetze*, a Senator of the Kingdom of Denmark,

*But rather
feemed
willing to
make the
Swedish
freedom
from paying
Custom, an
occasion of a
future
breach.*

which he spoke openly at Copenhagen at a meeting of the Commissioners of either party; to wit, that there could be no hopes of a firm and lasting Peace between the Northern Kingdoms, as long as the most Serene, the king of Denmark should make use of his Right in exacting the Custom of the Sound, and the Swedes would pretend a Freedom there.

In the eleventh Article of the Transaction at Roskild, they promise a restitution of those three Swedish ships, and of all the goods, with which they came laden from Portugal, which were taken and detained,

*Nor did the
Danes keep
their promise
in restoring
Swedish
ships and*

goods taken
before the
War
proclaimed.

as we formerly said, before the proclaiming of the War, in the Sound. But the Danes us'd their old trick in this too, and first by frivolous exceptions did endeavour to put off the performance of their promises, daring to affirm, that they only promis'd to restore the ships, but not the goods they were loaded with. As if it were a thing likely, that one that covenants for the restitution of goods taken from him, did not intend that they should be restored in the same condition they were in, and not spoiled and waisted or but part of them.

Indeed the Swedish Ambassadors urged the restitution of them that very time, when two of those ships rode at anchor in the Baltick sea not far from Newburgh in Fuhnen, by reason that Count *Wrangell* high Admiral of the Kingdom, had upon those coasts mariners in readiness, and such things as

were necessary to repair the ships; but they could not prevail with them, till they were first brought to *Copenhagen*, where after many delays they at last delivered them to a Swedish Captain, but in such a condition, that they could not stir from the Port of *Copenhagen* for want of things necessary for shipping before the end of *June*.

But as for the merchandize and other goods which yet remained in their hands, in regard they could not restore them by reason of the scarcity of salt, and the other things, they made this agreement, that they should pay in lieu of them 23000. Rixdollars, 17000 of which should be paid at *Hamburg*, the other at *Copenhagen* to one of the Ambassadors, which his Majesty should especially authorize to that purpose. *Marfell* and *Klingeberg* took the business upon them, both Merchants and Councillors to the King of Denmark, the one as to his Mines, the other to his Admiralty, yet so as that they promised by Bills obligatory to pay the money, as if it were their own proper debt. And for their sakes it was, that the payment of those moneys, which was to have been made before the first of *May*, if the Swedes would have stood upon the strictness of it, was deferred till a certain limited time.

The first payment was fairly carried, and the 6000. Dollars paid at *Copenhagen*; but as soon as the Letters of Exchange according to their Agreement were tendered at *Hamburg*, *Klingeberg* began to put them off with delays, and would not accept them, till he had received further intelligence, that they had given them a discharge at *Copenhagen*.

Who cannot see that this is a meer pretence, when as no man is so absurd to

desire to be discharged of a debt before payment, especially when the time of payment is not till some weeks after. But doubtless *Klingeberg* did that by the command of his superiours to gain time, and that they might in the mean while see to what place his Majesty of *Sweden* would march his Army. Afterwards when he was called upon a second time, the time for payment being come, he answered, that as Affairs stood, he could not pay any money for the Kingdom of *Denmark*, without any the least regard to his promise of payment of it as his own debt. Nay, if all circumstances

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be rightly considered, it appears plainly enough, that *Klingeberg* upon this account would never have paid a Farthing.

We formerly shew'd what hopeful signs the Danes gave of their performing the Peace,

*Nor did they
send the
2000. Horse-
men which
they were
bound to
send to the
Swede.*

when instead of 2000. Horse-men, they sent us but 936. never considering, that when they had performed that condition, the Swedish Army was to be drawn off from *Sealand*.

Therefore when the Swedish Ambassadors desired that those Horse men might be delivered to them with the greatest expedition they could, the Danish Commissioners said, they were not oblig'd to send them in any more. They said further, that the Muster-rolls, wherein the Soldiers were listed, did shew, that those three Regiments, which they delivered to them at first, did fully complete the number that was allotted them. And those were the Rolls that the Swedish Deputies desired to see often without the least effect when they first presented them,

But that is a pitiful exception, and such as none but the Danes would make use of; who think promises sufficiently performed by such idle scribbling. For what profit could the King of *Sweden* reap, in that those Regiments completed the number at *Copenhagen*, if he never receiv'd them? For it had been to little purpose for any one to have busied himself about the getting again of such Soldiers together, as use to have no punishment inflicted on them for disobeying their commands, since it was impossible to continue those men, that were delivered to him in their duty. For it was well

enough known, that of those that ran away after they were delivered to us, there were above 200. onely out of the Troups of *Axell Urop* that lay sculking in *Copenhagen* and other parts of *Sealand* as their Sanctuary, to speak nothing of above 30. of them that were of the King of *Denmarks* own Guard. The Swedish Ambassadors therefore at the instance of the Governour of *Schonen* acquainted *Urop* with it,

Nor would
they use
means to let
those be
recovered
who ran
away after
they were
sent.

desiring him that he would by publick authority enjoin some to give all aid and assistance to the Swedish Ministers in the recovery of those Renegado's, and bringing them to their colours: but then *Urop* began to make

himself a long apology, and to inveigh against the loose discipline of the Souldiery: that War now was a kinde of trade, and that they would have most souldiers where there was the greatest hopes of booty; that he could force no man to follow the Army against his will, and that he would perform his duty but ill, that went upon compulsion: yet he would acquaint his Sovereign with it, and see what his pleasure was. But he never return'd any answer to this day, so that the Officer that was sent by the Governour of *Schonen* for this purpose, who knew their names, and where they lay sculking, was forc'd to come back without the least thing done in it. But as by their silence we may easily argue their deniall of the request; so in this business the Danes shew their extreme injustice. For if he, which gives another power to raise souldiers in his Dominions, is by that very act bound, upon request made to give his assistance, if any run away, for the apprehending of them; the Danes were much more oblig'd of their own accord to have forc'd those souldiers, which they delivered to them, to their duty, if they had had the least respect to friendship or neighbourhood. We need not abound in words. The Danes were not onely pleas'd that their Horsemen would not follow the Swedish Camp, but did seem tacitely to command them to this deserting us. For it is likely, that those souldiers were not bound to the service by oath, onely for this end, that in case there should arise any scruple of conscience about it, it might easily be resolved upon remembrance, that they were as yet bound by oath to the King of *Denmark*,

*Nor free
those that
were sent,
from the
Oath of
former Al-
legiance by
Proclamation.*

especially in regard they were so often call'd upon to discharge those Horse-men by publick Proclamation from their former allegiance, and still put it off. But for all this, the Swedish Ambassadors persisted still in their often demands of the 1060. Horse, which were wanting, but never received any other answer, but that it was impossible in the condition *Denmark* was then in, that so many compleat Horse-men could be put in arms. But the Ambassadors that knew the contrary well enough, urg'd them further, yet withal being willing to rest satisfied, if instead of those thousand Horse, they would suddenly send them onely 500. Horse, and a 1000. Mufquetiers. For his most Serene Majesty of *Sweden*

thought this to be a lesser burthen to the Danes, as he himself affirm'd to *Owen Juul* at *Gothenburgh*. But they instead of the 1000. Mufquetiers promised 500. Dragoons, who being drawn from the Plough to the Sword, could give us no great hopes of staying long with their Colours. Upon which account when the Swedes refused them, the Danes promised that they would send command to *Eberstein* Camp-master General to deliver those 1000. Horse without any further delay upon the departure of the Swedish Army out of *Holftein*. But there was poison in the tail of it, and the Danes were in hopes, that if the Swedish Army had once moved, they would not put a stop upon their march, though they should not receive those 1000. Horse-men. When his Sacred Royal Majesty of *Sweden* therefore, who knew well enough that there were not so many Horse-men in all the Regal *Holftein*, had fully by his Ambassadors affirm'd the same to the Danish Ministers, and press'd very urgently, that some might be chose out of the Troups that were in *Sealand*,

*And when at
last 500.
Horse-men
were sent,
100. of them
left their
Colours, viz.
such as were
Danes by
birth.*

when they saw no way to evade it, they ordered at last that *Gyldenlow* should deliver him 500. Horse-men in Jutland and Eberstein, the rest in Holstein. *Gyldenlow* did his part first, yet in such a manner, that before they were conducted from Colding to Kiele, above 100. of those 500. Horse left their Colours, to wit, all that were Danes by birth. Hence it is no wonder that his most Serene Majesty of *Sweden* would not accept of any Dane amongst the 600. that were yet to be delivered to him, because it might very well be feared, that they were all well skill'd in the game of cheating the Swedes. But *Eberstein* us'd more delays, and at first signified to Count *Wrangell* by Letters, that he received a command from the King to deliver him 500. Dragoons not Troupers; but afterwards upon complaint made by the Swedish Ambassadors to the Danes, after a second command he presented to them 300. Troupers; but for the most part ragged, and tatter'd, and ill arm'd, which at first the Deputies of his Majesty of *Sweden* would not accept of, chiefly because the number allotted them was not completed; but afterwards General *Boddeker* accepted of about 400. Horse from *Eberstein*, when they were offered him a second time, not as making up

the number, but because he thought it policy by this means to weaken the Danes Forces, in case they should prove our enemies. But though the Danish Commissioners took much pains to persuade the Swedish Ambassadors, that there were not above 400. Troupers maintain'd in all *Denmark*, yet his most Serene Majesty knew how grossly in this they went against the truth, as afterwards the event proved it, when about the entering of the Swedish Army into *Sealand*, it plainly appeared that there were many more, than were to be delivered to his Majesty of *Sweden*.

Concerning Prisoners, the 19.

*It was
agreed
concerning
Prisoners, all
to be set at
liberty
without
Ransom.*

Article of the Agreements at *Roskild* had made this provision, that immediately after the Peace made, all should be set at liberty without any Ransom.

But as if the Danes thought it a thing commendable in them to put delays on us, the Governour of the Castle of *Bremer Vorden* would not set at liberty

the Swedifh Officers, that were prifoners with him, though urg'd to it again and again by the Counfell of State at *Bremer Vorden*, pretending, that he knew nothing of a Peace between the Northern Kingdoms; and granting it were fo, that thofe things, which the two Kingdoms had joyntly ordered, did not concern him; that he acknowledged no other power, but from his Majefty of *Denmark*, and that he could not fet his Prifoners at liberty,

But the Governour of Bremer Vorden did not obferve this agreement.

till he received a command from his Majefty to that purpofe. At laft when the Swedifh Ambaffadours fhew'd the Danifh Commiffioners the injuftice of this action, efpecially in regard the Swedes had been fo forward in this point, they were difmifs'd by the Kings command, but long after the time appointed for it. This is an argument of vaft negligence in the Danes, that they, as if it were a May game fhould not in due time fignifie to their Minifters what duty laid upon them to the execution of the late made Peace.

Juft fo, when the forefaid Governour of the Cattle of *Bremer-Vorden* had warning,

Nor did he deliver up the Cattle at the time appointed.

that his time of quitting of it was near, not onely complained as formerly, that he had no command for it, but befides took care for all kinde of grain and provifion, as if it were to keep out a long fiege, fparing no

if paper

cofts, and much at his own charge too, though otherwife a very penurious man. And, as if he had been afraid that he fhould not raife fufpicions bad enough, he gave further caufe of fufpicion by his ambiguous fpeeches and words of doubtful meaning: faying, That there was no neceffity for him to quit the Cattle; that by reafon he had been ufed to the Wars, he was unwilling to leave them off; and if happily the King of *Denmark* were weary of the War,

But feemed refolved to keep it by

force.

yet that there were other Kings and Princes, for whose service he might keep that Castle, and such other like high and vaunting speeches, which his pride was not ashamed to belch out.

But who that knows the Danes genius never so little, would not from thence conjecture all things to the worst, especially in that the Swedish Ambassadors, when they urg'd the restitution of the forefaid Castle at the Danish Court, had this answer, that the Governour had strict command without any the least delay or shifting to quit the Castle.

*And that by
the Kings
command,*

But the Governour stoutly denied it; so that one might justly have made a question whether of the two to believe in this case, the Danish Commissioners or the Governour, had he not produced Letters to justify his proceedings to be by the Kings command.

The Swedes upon this business began to suspect them, and were the more confirmed in it; in that the Ambassador of the King of Hungary made a most solemn promise to one of the Danish Nobles at *Copenhagen*, that upon condition they would not surrender up *Bremer-Vorden* to the Swedes,

*And upon
the offers
made by the
Ambassador
of the King
of Hungary
to man the
place against
the Swedes.*

that he would get as many of the choicest soldiery of the King his Majesty, to defend it and invade the Swedes, as they themselves should judge to be sufficient to effect it. That they should only say with courage and resolution, what they desired, and that presently they should have a very powerful Army.

Upon this his Sacred Royal Majesty of *Sweden* by his Ambassadors pressed the surrendering of it the more urgently, easily smelling out that there was some mischief a hatching, and the Danes designs contrary to their agreements appearing still more and more, but they would have had prevailed but little on them, and been cheated with fair promises, and effected nothing, had

they not by his Majesty's command began to give

(Paper)

out some threatening language, affirming to the Danish Commissioners faces,

*At last being
threatened
with a siege,
they gave it
up two
months
after the
time limited.*

that if they would not without any further circumstances surrender the Castle, that his Majesty would by violence reduce the Governour to his obedience, and set down his Army before it. For this was that which made them deliver up the place to the Swedes Deputies, but yet it was not till July, above the space of two months after the time limited them.

These things might easily have put a King of so generous a spirit, especially when he found himself thus flighted and abused, to take up arms: but his Majesty notwithstanding this restrained his passion, promising himself that the Danes would be more just and cheerful in doing those things that were behind.

But it is in vain to expect any justice from them, who think their affairs can never be well settled, if they be not supported by fraud and deceit.

We have as full an example of this in the restitution of a small ship of Norcoping,

*Nor did they
restore a ship
taken by
one of their
pirates
before War
denounced.*

which a Danish Pirate under commission from the King of Poland, long before the War was denounced, brought to Copenhagen laden with several sorts of Merchandise. For though the King of Denmark himself promised in his Letters to the Magistrate of Lubeck, who made a complaint of it by his Deputy, because these Swedish ships were allotted for the payment of some Citizens of Lubeck, that he would not suffer any of his Subjects to exercise Piracy unpunished; yet they could never get that restitution made, although

the Swedish Ambassadors did often desire the administration of Justice. Indeed after mocks and scorn, which the Citizens of Norcoping were subject to at Copenhagen, they did at last promise a restitution,

Letter Q Q.

Letter Q Q. but the Danes have not to this day performed the Article that was made thereupon, and which made part of the Declarative Receipts, Letter R R. shewing plain enough that they would perform nothing, only give fair words.

Letter R R.

But what could one promise himself from such kinde of Judges as these be, who, as the common report went at Copenhagen, had themselves been at the charge to set out and

arm that Pirate ship? Notable assertors indeed of the Rights that belong to the Northern Kingdoms in the Baltick Sea, who think it no benefice nor disrepute in them, to gape after filthy lucre under a Commission from the King of Poland, when as the King of Denmark himself grants him no power to War in the Baltick Sea.

The Danes too, forsooth, used the same kinde of cheerfulness in the restitution of those things,

*Nor did they
restore that
which was
taken from
Count Ko-
nigsmark af-
ter Peace
made.*

that were taken away by the Danish Soldiery from Count *Konigsmark*, and other Swedish Officers, after the Peace made at Toftrup; and however the Authors were well enough known, you might finde that the Danes had very happy wits to make excuses. Amongst which, this was none of the least, that those Soldiers, which had took that booty, knew not that the Peace was made. But this excuse was none of the most ingenious, seeing that ignorance, had it been really true and not asserted, could only exempt them from punishment, for violating the Peace, but not from restitution of the Spoil, according to the tenour of the eleventh Article at Roskild. And to what

purpose should a Court of War be appointed,

*Contrary to
the eleventh
Article of the
Peace
concluded at
Roskild.*

to which the King of Denmark signified by his Letters that he would submit this controversy, when as they which had committed the spoil did neither deny the fact, nor fly for it; nor was the restitution desired according to the Rules of Military Discipline, but the tenor of a Peace made. Yet notwithstanding the Swedish Ambassadors did very often instance it, and urg'd the restitution of those things that were taken away, but could get nothing but Danish promises, which come to more than a meer cheating of your expectation.

And that they might leave nothing unattempted,

*Nor would
they suffer
the Swedes
to take the
Victuals and
Corn which
was their
own store,
contrary to
the 14
Article of
their
agreement.*

that might tend to the avoiding of the Agreements, they prohibited the carrying away the Victuals and Corn which the Swedish Commissary had stored up in Alholm, a Jurisdiction of Laland, without any regard to the fourteenth Article, that affirms in express words, that restitution ought to be made of these places, the Victuals and Provision excepted.

In like sort there were very many of the Senators of Schonen, who by virtue of the Peace made, were to be bound by

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Oath to the most Serene the King of Sweden,

*Nor were
many of the*

*Senators of
Schonen dif-
charged of
their Oaths
by the Dane,
though they
liued for a
difcharge*

that could not prevail with the Daniſh Court, that they might be difcharged from the Employments and Offices, which they had hitherto adminiftr'd. And ſome of them were at laſt ſo wearied out with ſhifts ſometimes of one fort, ſometimes of another, that one may ſay juſtly enough, they were hindered from performing this Oath to the Swedes: but others of them out of an hope of a change, which they ſaw was not far off, neglected to do it, becauſe they believ'd they muſt ere long forget it.

Afterwards too, when this Serene Majeſty of Sweden was made acquainted, that one *Henry Carloff* an Adventurer,

*Nor did the
Danes
obſerve the
eleventh
Article of the
Treaty at
Roſkild,
concerning
the African
Company of
Sweden, in
the Caſe of
Henry
Carloff*

and formerly one of the Governors of the African Company in Sweden, by reaſon of an injury, as he contrived it, done to him by the Swediſh Governors, becauſe he had us'd a private trade in the coaſts of Guine, directly contrary to the Priviledges of that Company, and his Faith engag'd thereto, had not onely privately tranſported his whole Family from Hamburg to Embden; but that he might the more infect and damage the foreſaid Swediſh Company, without any regard to his promiſes and the ſecurity he had given, had got himſelf in the time of the War a Commiſſion from the King of Denmark, and to that purpoſe about the middle of Autumn 1657. weigh'd anchor from Embden, and went with a ſhip arm'd and well-appointed for Guine; his Majeſty upon a fitting and ſubmiſſive deſire of the Sharers of the ſaid Company, could not out of his ſingular clemency ſuffer,

that the safety of his faithful Subjects, as much as was concern'd in this business, should be put to an hazard in the Treaties at Roskild, but rather seriously enjoyn'd his Commissioners, that were appointed for that Transaction, to provide the best they could for the profit and interests of that Company.

But in regard no man could so much as dream, that the Danes should use any difficulty in granting the particulars, when they allow'd of the general; nor was there any certainty as yet, at the time the Treaty was concluded, whether *Carloffe* had done any damage in Guine: the Commissioners of his Sacred Royal Majesty of Sweden thought it sufficient, as it had

really been sufficient, had they not had to do with cavillers, that that caution desired by the Members of the African Company in Sweden, should be made in general terms for every case, and put into the eleventh Article of the Instrument of Peace, in this form: to wit, *That all those Prizes which might have been taken by virtue of Commissions given, but were not brought into Ports before the Transaction of Tostrup, should be restored to their true and lawful Owners.* For these words being so general, do not only comprehend this case of Guine, but can be understood of no other, in that during the War, no Prize could be taken either in the German or Baltick Sea, which was not brought into a Swedish or Danish Harbour before the Transaction at Tostrup made in February, because at that season of the Year there is no failing at all in these Northern Countries, in regard the cold is so great, that the whole Country is frozen over. Wherefore these words are principally to be applied to those Prizes, which during the War, and immediately before the composition might have been taken, but by reason of the great distance of the place, could not be brought into Harbor, where they ought to be adjudged. Truly the Swedes had never started any doubt about the genuine sense of those words alledged, had they not been sufficiently taught by so many Arguments and Trials, that the Danes did watch after all occasions, whereby by false and far-fetched interpretations, they might free themselves from those things they were oblig'd to perform by virtue of the Instrument of Peace. Therefore the Swedish Ambassadors, that they might timely prevent any mischief about the true understanding of the eleventh Article, as much of it as belonged to the African Company, asked of the Danish Commissioners at a meeting had at Copenhagen in April, whether the words above-written, speaking of the Prizes taken under Commission from the Dane, were so to be understood, that this case might be comprehended under them, if happily contrary to hope any damage should be done to the African Company in Sweden by a private man, that should make Prize under Commission from the King of Denmark; to which the Danes answer was

finply Affirmative, alledging that not onely this, but all other cafes

whatsoever were comprehended under those general words. But afterward when for the better caution, the Swedish Ambassadors would put the case in an Article, and insert it amongst other Points, that were to be explained in the Project of an additional Receipts, the Danes fought out several ways to shift it off, and evade it, pretending in this as in many other points, that there was no need of any Declaration, for his Majesty of Denmark was very ready to do all that he was oblig'd to by virtue of the Agreements at Roskild, if in case any damage was done to the African Company, contrary to the Instrument of Peace.

Nevertheless the Swedish Ambassadors still urg'd it, especially after they had received certain intelligence, that *Carloffe* was gone up from Guine to the River of Elbe with a great prize, having seized upon all the Swedes Forts there, and carried the Governour of them along with him Prisoner to *Gluckstadt*; and that he himself was fled with the best part of the gold, and other merchandize of great value, which he had taken away in Guine, and made some alteration in the Article which they had drawn, fitting it more expressly to the present case, as will appear,

Letter SS.

if you look into the Letters S S.

The Danes strive'd to acquit themselves from the obligation of the restitution they were bound to by reason *Carloffe* was fled; but this was but a vain plea, in regard the most Serene the King of *Denmark* and his Ministers having had timely notice of it, should have used all their endeavour to stop him from getting away to the damage and prejudice of others. For the Minister Resident at *Hamburg* did in the name of his Sacred Royal Majesty of *Sweden*, as soon as ever he heard that the ship was gone up the River of *Elbe*, by a Secretary, whom he had sent away to *Gluckstadt* to that purpose, earnestly desire not onely of the Counsel of the Government there, but of Field Marshal *Eberstein* that they would detain and secure the foresaid *Carloffe* with all the goods he had brought with him, to the end that restitution might be the better made, according to the tenor of the agreements at *Roskild*, not onely of the Castle of *Capo-Cors*, but of all other the Swedes Forts in the Coasts of *Guine*, as also the ship and moveable goods taken

away from the said Company. But all this pains was taken to no purpose, as the relation of Secretary *Barlhene* that was sent from *Hamburg* to *Gluckstadt* hereunto annexed, Letter T T. doth more fully shew,

Letter T T.

with all the circumstances of it. Upon this the Swedish Ambassadors received command from his Majesty being then at *Flensburg*, not only speedily to make up that point that concerns the African Company, but further to urge,

*Whereupon
the Swede
threatens
not to march
with his
Army out of
Denmark till
the African
Company
was
satisfied.*

that the Danes should without any more delay make just satisfaction to the foreaid company, or otherwise his Sacred Royal Majesty would not march his Army out of *Denmark*; or if so be that restitution could not so soon be made, they should take good and certain security before the removal of the Army for sure and true payment, and restitution of these places they had seized at the time prefixed.

And indeed the Swedes had very great reason to look circumspectly in this affair, in regard that it was plain enough by their dismissing of *Carloffe*, that the Danes never heartily resolv'd to make reparations of the losses the faithful subjects of *Sweden* had sustained, especially when there were so many several circumstances besides that might give the Swedes just cause to suspect the Danes injustice and perverseness in this business. Amongst which, this was none of the least, that *Carloffe* was reported to have sworn those Souldiers, which he had placed in Garrison in the Castles of *Guine*, not to the King of *Denmark*,

Letter U U.

but himself, Letter U U. and he with the greatest part of his prize had withdrawn himself from the Danish Jurisdiction, and put himself under the protection of another Lord. But the damage that the Swedish Company sustained, was valued to be above 300000. Rixdollars, besides the Castle of *Capo-Cors*, and other Forts and Merchants houses built and enjoyed by the Swedes, of all which restitution ought to have been made.

This was shew'd the Danes, and the Swedish Ambassadors did propound, to

avoid for the future all diffentions and differences that might arise about the number and quantity of the moveable goods that were taken away, that a certain summe of money should be agreed upon as just and equitable, which

[Project]
the loss sustained by the Swedish Company should be rated at, from which should be deducted what ever could here in *Europe*, or else there in *Africk* be restored *in specie*, but yet according to the common rate that commodities did bear at that place and time, when the restitution should be made. And thence it was, that the summe of 400000. Rixdollars was put in the foresaid Swedish Project, not that the Swedish Ambassadors would rigidly and peremptorily stick upon that summe, but as a summe of which something might be agreed on or remitted, as was shew'd and told to the French Ambassador, as soon as the Project was first mentioned. Nor could they justly be found fault withal, in that they desired real security upon pawn given, it being a thing customary and usual betwixt Princes, and chiefly done for that end, that the debtor may be the stronger bound to pay his debt, and redeem his pawn. Nor could that giving of pawn be any damage to the Danes, had they resolv'd to pay the moneys they promis'd without any fraud at the time appointed, because it was in the Danes power to make over such goods in security to the Swedes, as might be appointed to them according to the commodity of their situation, and where there were no places of defence.

But how just soever the things were that were desired, they relish'd not well with the Danes, whose whole labour was to avoid and shift themselves off from that business by wasting time, not considering what they had so roundly confess'd in the name of the most Serene the King of *Denmark* concerning the genuine sense of the Eleventh Article of the agreements at *Roskild*, but making use of these reasons following: and first,

*The Danes
alledge
reasons why
no restitution
is to be
made to the
Guine Com-
pany of that
which H.
Carloffe had
taken.*

that they could pretend no right to those goods that were taken away in *Guine*, in regard it is certain, that they were brought into Port before the pacification of *Toftrup*, persuading themselves that a Port in *Africk* in this

cafe was equivalent to a Port of Denmark; and that therefore no doubt or controverſie ought to be made about the Danes poſſeſſion of thoſe things they had taken away, though they were brought to Denmark, or to Holſtein after the Tranſaction at Toſtrup, no more then the Danes could pretend a right to the ſhip called *Delmenhorſt*, which was ſeized by Count *Wrangel* high Admiral

of *Denmark* not far from *Corſoer* in a Daniſh Port, but could not be brought to a Swediſh Port before the tranſaction at *Toſtrup*.

The Daniſh Commiſſioners further urg'd, that they were bound by vertue of the Fourteenth Article of the Agreements at *Roskild*, to make reſtitution of nothing but onely the Forts in *Guine*, in regard all other things remaining there, as guns, ſhips, gold, and other merchandize were to be accounted moveables, which in a Continent and a Port, were by the right of War, together with the Fort yielded up, and in the power of the King of *Denmark*.

Thirdly, They endeavored to aſſert, that *Carloffe* was not to be accounted ſuch a man, as onely takes prize by a private Commiſſion, but a real Officer of War of the King of Denmark's, lawfully authorized and expreſly commanded to ſeize upon the foreſaid places, and to bring away their merchandize for the ſervice of the King of Denmark.

Fourthly, They ſaid that according to the claufe of the Eleventh Article of the Agreements at *Roskild*, Reſtitution ought not to be made of thoſe Goods that *Carloffe* in the name of the King of Denmark took away in the Continent, or in the Port, becauſe there is onely mention made of ſuch Goods as might have been taken by thoſe that had a publick Commiſſion and fought in the Kings ſervice in the open Sea, as the word Prize ſhewes, which muſt onely be underſtood of Ships, and cannot be extended to ſuch things as are taken away in the Continent, and therefore that thoſe things, which *Carloffe* had done, were not to be accounted among them.

On the other ſide the Swediſh Ambaſſadors did produce more and clearer arguments,

*The Swediſh
reply to
thoſe
Arguments.*

to ſhow that the pretence, which they made to thoſe Goods that were taken and ſeized in the time of War at *Guine*, had not it's foundation ſo much in the difference, which according to common acceptance might be one thing in

an Officer of War, and another thing in him that sets out a Ship at his own charge, and makes prize only by virtue of a publick Commission, as in the express agreement made in this business at Roskild. For as exceptions would infringe Lawes, and set up a new Rule, according to which, those

things that are agreed on, must be guided: so in this case we ought rather to consider what both parties agreed on in this business, then that which commonly in the like case use to be kept and observ'd amongst others, especially if the thing be not specifically determined.

That every one knows well enough, that the Peace made with the enemies, is restrain'd only to *Europe*, and not extended to other places situate out of it, as the Spaniards once answer'd the English; nay, that during the while the Treaties for a twelve years Truce betwixt the Spaniard and States General lasted, the Equinoctial Line was propos'd as the limit and boundary, within which the Peace and Truce was of full force and virtue; but on the other side of it the War was still to be continued. The very same case, if approved by either party, would be this, that some places in regard of their situation, though subject to the jurisdiction of one and the same Lord, should by a particular agreement be annoy'd and infected with War, whilst others under the same Lord should enjoy a quiet Peace; which Peace nevertheless had there not been a previous agreement, and had Peace been simply concluded, ought to have been extended to all places without any difference. In like manner if there were no difference made in the Treaties between the moveable goods and immoveable goods that were seized, all then would come under the same law, as much as concerns restitution, although in our case there was a peculiar and an express covenant, as we shall hereafter more at large prove. If therefore a distinction might be made betwixt places, as was above said, and also betwixt goods moveable and immoveable taken in the time of the War, why not betwixt persons too, that had seized any thing during the War, as the Eleventh Article of the Agreements at *Roskild* would clearly lay it before us.

And truly that any unbiass'd and unprejudic'd man, that considers the said Article, unless he will purposely do so, should fully and sufficiently understand, that in it is establish'd first, that all immoveables, to wit, Provinces and Fortresses taken from the Kingdom of *Sweden* in the heat of the War, where-soever situated, should be restor'd to his Sacred Royal Majesty

of *Sweden*. Secondly, that restitution should be made of all moveables taken from the Swedish Subjects before the beginning of the War, as also of three ships laden with salt, and detain'd in the Sound, or the true value of them. Thirdly, that all moveables, which during the War might have been taken

before the Tranfaction at *Toftrup*, by fouldiers, and others that followed the Camp, and by fuch as endamaged the enemy not onely as belonging to fome company, but as maintained at the charge of the Principal Officers, are plainly not liable to the reftitution, by an argument *à contrario*, principally grounded on thefe words; *What goods and moveables foever befides after that time, from the fubjects of the one party, or of the other, &c.*

Fourthly, That all moveables, whether fhips, guns, merchandize, and fuch like, taken by vertue of Commiffions by private men, who onely at their charge, and chiefly for their own proper benefit fet out and furnifh fhips to make prize, but brought into Port before the Pacification at *Toftrup*, fhould likewife be free from reftitution.

But, fifthly, if any private man making Prize under publique Commiffion, had taken away any thing by Sea or Land, and had not, before the Pacification compleated at *Toftrup*, brought it in to fuch a Port, where, according to the forme ufed amongft the more civiliz'd Nations, it might be declar'd as lawful Prize according to the Lawes of the Admiralty, that that was to be reftor'd to its lawful owner. Therefore that two things are principally requifite, to make fuch things as were taken away not liable to reftitution; to wit, that they were not onely taking during the War, but brought into Port before the 18th. day of February, 1658. when the Pacification at *Toftrup* was made. Nor that the Danifh Commiffioners, which were prefent at the Treaties at *Roskild*, could deny, that thofe words, *Of Prizes taken during the time of the Commiffion, but not as yet brought into Ports*, were added by the Swedes for the good and profit of the Subjects of his Sacred Royal Majefty of *Sweden*, and made ufe of onely for the caution and benefit of the African Company of *Sweden*; and therefore ought in no wife to be fruſtrated and avoided, but according to Juſtice

and Equity to ſtand in full force and vertue.

Which if really fo, as it cannot be otherwife, and that *Carloff*e cannot make himſelf out to be any other, then one that under Commiffion from the Danes hath done damage to the Swedes in Africk; nor hath not brought the greateſt part of his Prize to *Gluckſtad* before June, to wit, fome moneths after the time limited; it neceſſarily follows, that the Danes, by vertue of the Pacification at *Roskild*, are bound to make real ſatisfaction to the Swediſh Company.

For it is very certain that *Carloff*e had fet on foot and acted this villany at the charge and hazard of himſelf and his complices; nor could the Danes prove with all their endeavours, that he either received any money from the King

of *Denmark* to arm and let out his ship, or that any of his Soldiers were bound in this action by Oath to the King of *Denmark*; or lastly, that they had the least pay promised them. Whence it was, that the Danish Commissioners, though the Swedish Ambassadors oftentimes desired it, would not produce a copy of the Commission and Instructions, that were given to *Carloffe*, because they were afraid that the tenor of that would make it appear, that *Carloffe* was only a private man, making Prize under publique Commission, and no real Officer of War of the King of *Denmark*. But though the Swedish Ambassadors were not so happy as to see that commission, yet they could plainly collect, that *Carloffe*, in that he convey'd himself privately and by stealth from *Gluckstad*, and implor'd the aid and protection of other Commonwealths and States, did principally look at the benefit and profit of himself and his complices, and not of the Kingdom of *Denmark*; and that the cause of his fear was, lest the Danes should desert him in this business, and force him to perform the Agreements at *Roskild* in that point. Unless you will rather say, that *Carloffe* fled by the command and advice of the Danes, because they suppos'd, that by this means they might the easier free themselves from making satisfaction.

Besides, the Swedish Ambassadors put the Danish Commissioners in mind, that it was no new and unusual thing, for those that made Prize under a publique Commission, to seize

upon fortified places, and do damage as well by Land as by Sea. That that was manifest enough from the actions of the Companies of the East and West Indies in Holland, who besides their Traffique wag'd such a kind of War under a Publique Commission, when as the Members of those Companies, though some of them be of a Publique capacity are to be considered only as private men in this business. Besides that experience doth testify, that he that by virtue of a Commission granted him, doth arm and furnish out ships at his own charge against the Enemy, gets power likewise to injure his Enemy not only at Sea, but at Land too, if he can. And that the English did that frequently in the former War with Spain.

Nor can that word *Prize*, which is used in the foregoing eleventh Article, be restrained only to ships, or to that, which is taken at Sea, seeing rather by the general signification of it, it comprehends all kind of booty whether by Sea or Land; and that in the French Tongue, whence it hath its original, it denotes booty, spoil, and every thing that is taken away from any enemy, nor can it be otherwise construed or expounded.

That it is likewise nothing to the purpose, that the ship called Stockholm-Castle, which lay at anchor not far from the Castle Capo-Cors, was as the

Danes declare, brought to a Danish Port from those places after the Castle was won, before the Pacification; when as the word *was brought*, hath a particular signification here, and is to be understood according to the condition of the matter it speaks of; to wit, in the same sense, it useth to be taken and construed in such kinde of private expeditions and ventures, made by vertue of Commissions granted them, as we said before. For who, pray, in Africk should declare and adjudge, whether that ship and other moveable goods were taken justly, and according to the Rules of their Commission, when there was none there empowered to it? Nor could *Carloffe* and his Complices do it, because no man hath liberty to be judge in his own cause. Wherefore it follows upon necessity, that the Danes were not exempted from restitution, because the Prize was brought before the Pacification at Toftrup to an African Port; but it was further

requisite to make the possession legal and safe, to bring those goods, that were taken away, into a Danish Port. Besides that that ship could not properly be said to have been brought into a Danish Port in *Africk*, because it lay there before; nor could the other merchandize or moveables, which were found in the Castle *Capo-Cors*, and seized together with it, be accounted to be brought thither by *Carloffe*, in as much as they were there before, and were onely by him carried away from thence.

But that the Danish Commissioners were quite besides the question, in comparing the ship *Delmenhorst* that was seized upon not far from *Corfoer*, with this business of *Guine*, seeing that foresaid Man of War taken in the time of the War by the Soldiers of his Sacred Royal Majesty of *Sweden*, hath nothing at all of the case of a Pirate Ship, that private men which having right to fight by vertue of Commissions they have got granted, use to set forth for their own profit, but that business is rather to be guided by the rule of the often mentioned Eleventh Article, by vertue of which the ship *Delmenhorst* might justly be kept by the Swedes, though it was not brought into another Swedish Port before the conclusion of the Peace; but the Prize that was made in *Guine* by one that had a Commission, and not brought into a Danish Port before the Pacification, ought by all Law to be restored.

That it was to no purpose too, to alledge the Fourteenth Article of the Agreements at *Roskild* in this business, which did not at all belong to it, and spoke onely of the Forts and Fortresses, that were either seized by the Armies here in *Europe*, or were to be surrendered by the Pacification at *Roskild* in satisfaction to the Kingdom of *Sweden*, because they were to be delivered naked, without Guns or any Ammunition or Provision, as may be seen from the context of the Fourteenth Article, and especially in that, which was ordered about the end of that Article: to wit, *That the Bores of those*

Jurifdictions, in which thofe Forts are fciuated, are bound to carry all their Warlick Ammunition and Provifion to the fhore, that they might the more conveniently be fhip'd and carried away, a thing nothing at all applicable to this cafe of Guine: But that the natural place, to which this bufinefs related, was in the forefaid Eleventh Article,

where firft it was generally ordered, that all Provinces and Places feized upon in the time of the War, and taken from the Kingdom of *Sweden*, *wherefoever they were fciuated*, fhould be reftored; and afterwards there was fpecial provifion made about goods moveable, to this purpofe, that all thofe Prizes (amongft which thofe alfo are legally comprehended, which were taken from the Swedifh Subjects in the Cattle *Capo-Cors* and the Coafts of *Guine*) which might have been taken by Commiffions gained, but not brought into Port by the time limited, fhould be reftored again, as we fhew'd you before, to their lawful Proprietors.

At laft when the Danifh Commiffioners had nothing of weight or moment that they could reply againft thofe reafons that were alledged, and the Swedifh Ambaffadors did preffingly urge as well themfelves, as by *Monfieur Terlon* the French Ambaffadour, their abfolute and pofitive anfwer, they made recourfe to their ufual fhifts; and that they might delay time, and avoid and elude the execution of the Peace,

*The Danes
feek to refer
the bufinefs
to
Arbitrators.*

faid, that it was but equitable, that that controverfie, according to the cuftom brought in and approv'd on in the Agreements at *Stetin*, fhould be compofed by fome Arbitrators chofen to that purpofe, in regard they verily believed, that both parties were furnifhed with good reafons to render the thing plain to them.

But the Swedifh Ambaffadours, as they had formerly about the Ifland *Ween*, fo in this bufinefs alfo upon good grounds refufed it, proving by very ftrong arguments, that this controverfie did depend upon the execution of the Peace lately made,

*But the
Swedes
refufe this.*

and was not fuch as arofe anew between thofe Northern Kingdoms after the

Peace was allotted for execution, or was in the pacification it self devolv'd and cast upon the judgement of Arbitrators, and therefore was not of that nature and condition, as that it ought, according to the tenour of the Agreements at *Stetin*, be decided by Arbitrators.

Nay, his Sacred Royal Majesty of *Sweden* himself, who in the mean time went from *Gothenburgh* to *Flensburgh*, and wished nothing more, then that the Executive Treaties at *Copenhagen* might speedily come to an happy issue, and earnestly desired, without the trial of further controversies with the Kingdom

Denmark,
of *Denmark*,

*The King of
Sweden
writes to the
King of
Denmark a-
bout the
business.
Let. X X.*

to march with his Army out of *Jutland* and *Holftein*, to pursue with the greater force and efficacy the purpose he had intended in other places, to shew how heartily he respected that business of *Guine*, sent Letters concerning it to the most Serene the King of *Denmark*, Letter XX. enjoying likewise his Ambassadors at *Copenhagen*, that in the private audience they were to have of the King of *Denmark* for this business, they would set before them the injustice of the Danes in this Affair and others concerning the executive Treaties, and that without any kind of sticking at it, they should tell them openly and plainly,

*And
demands
real caution
for restitution
before his
Army should
depart from
Denmark.*

that before he had received real caution or security for the undoubted payment of the moneys, and restitution of those places they had seized, that he neither could nor would march his Army out of the Kingdom of *Denmark*, because he could not put the least confidence in the bare words and promises of the Danes. All which things, though the Swedish Ambassadors

faithfully related and spoke openly, both to the most Serene the King of *Denmark* at the private Audience, and to his chief Ministers at other meetings,

*But the
Danes are
not induced
to do their
duty.*

yet they could never move them to the performing of their duty in the observation of the Agreements at *Roskild*.

Indeed it cannot be denied, that the Danes made a show in words, that they were willing to restore, all that should be found at Glückstad of the Goods taken away in Guine, and to give satisfaction afterward for the rest, that *Carloffe* had privily convey'd away with him, so that they would give them so much time,

*Onely they
promise in
words some-
thing to be
restored in
time,*

as whilst they might draw in *Carloffe* again to them, or bring him under their power; and when that was done, that without doubt, as they said, the places taken in Africk should be restored, as soon as ever a Ship could perform so long a voyage. But in the interim, before this restitution and payment was truly performed,

*But would
not hear of
any real
caution.*

they would not hear a word of giving real caution or security, pretending that they were in no wise bound by the Agreements at Roskild to give any caution. And because any one that sides with neither party can easily perceive, how foolish and weak this reason is, we thought it scarcely worth while to trouble you farther with what the Danes were answered to it.

Onely we cannot pafs by the ftrange kinde of acting that is ufual with the Danes in this affair, that, when the Swedifh Ambaffadours did often defire, and urge their abfolute and pofitive anfwer concerning the real caution they demanded, they would excufe themfelves, that they could not pawn to the Swedes any Lands or immoveable Goods, but yet that they would promife them, that they would bring them fome Hamburg Merchants,

*Yet promife
that
Merchants
fhould take
the debt
upon them
as their own.*

that fhould engage themfelves, to make good the fatisfaction they defired to the African Company, at the time prefix'd, as if it were their own proper Debt. Which, when the Swedifh Ambaffadours upon new Inftuctions from his Majefty, affented to, and were content with that fecurity they had propofed; then the Danes turn'd cake in the pan, and recanted their words,

*Which when
the Swedes
accepted as
a caution,
the Danes
afterward
recanted.*

they had formerly fpoke, about giving in that fecurity in the prefence of the French and Swedifh Ambaffadors, pretending, that in the condition the Kingdom of Denmark was at that prefent in, and the lownefs of their fortunes, they could not perfwade any Forreign Merchants to undertake upon themfelves the payment of fo great a fum. The caufe of this alteration doubtlefs was, that, in regard they had heard, that his Sacred Royal Majefty of Sweden was ready to march away with his Army, and that the Ambaffadors of the Elector of Brandenburg were gone from Flensburgh without effecting any thing, they would not believe, that he would for the bufinefs of Guine, which onely concerns fome private perfons, put off that expedition, which he had refolved on, much lefs wholly give it over.

Afterward when the Danes were fhew'd the unworthinefs of this action, and every one did verily believe, that the bufinefs would be done without any further delays and pretences, unlefs they would have no mercy neither on

themselves, nor of their Countrey-men in Jutland and Holstein,

*To decline
an answer to
the Swedish
Ambassadors,
the Dane
sends his
Ambassador
to the
Swedish
King.*

who by reason of the stay of the Swedish Army, occasioned by the unreasonable and unnecessary shiftings of the Danes, were under a very great oppression: his most Serene Majesty of Denmark instead of an answer, which he should have given the Swedish Ambassadors to their Proposals, sent away *Owen Juul* in an Embassy about the end of June to his Sacred Royal Majesty of Sweden,

who amongst other instructions carried Letters,

Let. Y Y.

Y Y. in which indeed he answered the fore-mentioned Letters of his Majesty of Sweden, but in such a manner, that it was apparent enough, that the Danes never intended to give full and just satisfaction to the African Company.

The Swedish Ambassadors perceiving it endeavoured but in vain to hinder that Embassy, and shew'd them both by Monsieur *Terlon* the French Ambassadors, who was then at Copenhagen, and they themselves declar'd more at large to the chief Ministers of the Kingdom of Denmark, how unusual and unfitting a thing it would be, for the King of Denmark to dispatch an Embassy to his Sacred Royal Majesty of Sweden, for the transacting of that controverſie, concerning which the Swedish Ambassadors Resident at Copenhagen, were empowered with very large Commissions, and had very lately as it were anew been by Letters Credential to the King of Denmark, appointed to finish that business; that they had done their duty, and not onely justly declar'd what they were commanded, and urg'd their answer, but expected it too almost every moment. That they themselves,

*Which the
Swedish Am-
bassadors*

*en-
deavoured
to diffwade,
but in vain.*

and all others of judgement that were skill'd in these affairs, could not but believe, that this Embassy was set on foot, onely to spend time, and in hope that his Majesty of Sweden would hereafter be forc'd in the mean while to march his Army out of the Danish Provinces; which if it should so happen, the Danes would show little or nothing at all of endeavour and good will, in making reparations to the African Company; but that they dare boldly affirm, that their hope would extremely fail them, in as much as they certainly knew, that his Sacred Royal Majesty of Sweden, in regard he had seen them so full of shifts and changes, would not stir with his Army out of Jutland, before that whole affair were fully compleated. Besides that they were afraid, that his Sacred Royal Majesty would interpret that Message to be but a meer elusion and shifting off the Agreements, which might be the cause of great heart-burnings betwixt these Northern Kingdoms, to the great damage and prejudice of the Danes.

Yea, his Sacred Royal Majesty of Sweden himself did begin

so far to suspect the Danes preposterous manner of acting, that upon that ground,

*And the
King of
Sweden re-
presents to
the Danish
Ambassadors
the injustice
of the Danish
proceeding,
And urges
his own
Ambassadors
at Cop-
penhagen to
dispatch the
business
there. Letter
ZZ.*

he was pleas'd not onely to set out at large the extreme injustice of the Danes to *Owen Juul*, at his coming to him, but sent charge amongst other things to his Ambassadors residing at Copenhagen, to dispatch the business

of Guine, Letter ZZ.

In the mean time all the while *Juul* was employ'd about that Embaffy, in which there were fome weeks fpent, the Daniſh Commiſſioners would not give the Swediſh Ambaffadors any meeting in Coppenhagen; and at ſuch times as they were called upon to it, which was very often, they answered, that they muſt firſt expect the return of *Owen Juul*. At laſt that they might not ſeem to do nothing, and upon the news that was brought, that the Poles and Auftrians had laid cloſe ſiege to the City of Thoren,

*The Danes
hearing of
the ſiege of
Thoren,*

that the King of Hungary was choſen Emperour of Germany, and that part of the Swediſh Army had already begun their march into Germany, they wreted and refuſed almoſt all thoſe things, which the Commiſſioners themſelves before,

*Begin to re-
tract all what
they
formerly had
promiſed.*

and principally *Gerſdorff* High Steward of the Kingdom had ſo often promiſed, about the ſatisfaction that was to be given to the African Company. For though before the departure of *Owen Juul*, this queſtion, to wit, whether the Danes were in juſtice bound to make ſatisfaction for the damage done at Guine, or no? was carried in the Affirmative, and that they were bound to make it; and onely this queſtion, how, to wit, whether ſatisfaction ought to be made for all things taken away from the Swediſh Company in Guine, or alſo, whether real caution was to be given for the greater certainty of payment, or no? remained, which the Ambaffadors and Commiſſioners of both parties were to diſcuſs; the Danes that lay at lurch and waited how the times would go, and when they might have occaſion to order their affairs as beſt pleas'd themſelves, took heart again, and not onely denied all other ſatisfaction,

*Except
onely the
reſtitution of
the Caſtle
Capo-Cors.*

except the reftitution of the Caftle of Capo-Cors onely, but would have the whole bufinefs referred to the judgement of Arbitrators.

In order to which, the Danifh Commiffioners did by Monfieur *Terlon* the French Ambaffador deliver their Project to

Project

the Swedifh Ambaffadors, Let. AAA.

*Let. AAA.
And then
give a new
Project to
the Swedes
by the
Ambaffador
of France.*

which having no reaſon in it that was of any weight, or could put any fair glofs of truth upon the Danes unjuſt purpoſe herein, except thoſe they had formerly brought, which had been ſo often confuted and exploded, his moſt Serene Majeſty upon ſudden notice of it, was caſt into ſuch an admiration, that he could not tell what he ought to expect in the future from ſuch unconftant and fickle people

But after that the Danes underſtood, partly from the relation of *Owen Juul*, and partly from the Letters of his Sacred Royal Majeſty of *Sweden* to the King of *Denmark*, that his Sacred Royal Majeſty would in this caſe remit nothing of the right of his faithful Subjects, they met with the Swedifh Ambaffadours again, and exhibited a Project the 17. day of July, Letter *BBB*.

*Let. BBB.
And again
another
Project to
the Swedifh
Ambaffadors
by
themyſelves.
But the
Swedifh not
accepting
their Project,
offer to them
another of
their own.
Let. CCC.*

which was written so captiously and ambiguously, that under the shelter and refuge of it, the Danes had a liberty to defer their payment from day to day, and might find divers pretences to raise doubts and controversies whether it were to be paid or no. Whereupon the Swedish Ambassadors the very next day made another Project, in which there was more care taken and better caution for the certain payment of the money, Letter CCC. and sent it to the Danish Commissioners.

But the Danes were no better pleased with this, than with the former Swedish Project, in regard that it did for the most part cut off all occasions, which the Danes might in the future at their pleasure lay hold on, to exempt and free themselves from giving the satisfaction they had promised. But as the Danes never resolv'd with themselves heartily fully to satisfy the African Company in this point,

*Which the
Danes
accept of.*

so that could not be wellcome to them that oblig'd them to the Agreements at *Roskild*. Nay, that there might be a just cause of wonder at them,

*And do not
so much as
perform that
which they
had
promised in
their own
Project, so
far as the
Swedes did
accept of it.*

the Danes could not be brought to make restitution of that part of the African Prize that was at *Gluckstad*, which they themselves promised in their own Project, though they were often required to do it. For though they had time long enough granted them for to make restitution of those things that were taken away, and they had besides other means proposed to

them, by which the Danes might better their condition, and the more easily bear with it, yet they could get nothing out of them but the foresaid Project, what labour and industry forever the Swedish Ambassadors used to minde the Danes of their duty.

So that

*thereupon
the whole
Treaty might
be laid to
have had an
end in this
business.*

So that one may justly say, that the whole Treaty had an end in this business; and that it is left to the discussion of abler judgements, how little of those things the Danes have voluntarily and willingly done, to which they were bound by the tie of conscience and solemn agreements, and which they had so often oblig'd their faith to perform.

There were,

*Yet in more
other things
the Danes
did fail.*

besides these we have formerly mentioned more things yet, by which one might sufficiently enough perceive the unbounded desire of the Danes to misinterpret the Agreements, as those things that were to be performed mutually in their salutes at the Castles situated on both sides of the Sound,

*As
concerning
the salutes of
the Castles
on both sides
of the
Sound.*

as also their giving notice, if happily any Fleet of War pass'd through the Sound, and the moneys which use to be exacted of those that sail in the foresaid Sea, to keep lights at night in the Watch-Tower; and such other things of the like nature which came into dispute. For when *Schonen* is granted with all the superiority belonging to that Territory as well by Land as Sea to the Swedes, that is likewise presum'd to be granted, that useth to belong and is proper to all the Castles and Forts adjacent to the Sea, as the honour of a salute to be given by the ships that pass by. Nevertheless the Danes contended that that solemn salute was to be performed to the Castle of *Croneburgh* by the Swedish ships, yet so that the Danish ships were not bound to observe the same honour to the Castle of *Helfinburgh*. This truly were to deny the Swedes the superiority in *Schonen*, which the Danes

arrogated to themselves in *Sealand*, as if the Swedes had not the same right in their possession of *Schonen*, as the Danes have in *Sealand*. From thence too it was, that the Danes after the Agreements at *Roskild* took the boldness to exact the giving of warning, if any Swedish Fleet passed the Sound,

*And the
giving of
warning
when a
Swedish
Fleet did
pass the
Sound*

which the Agreements at *Bromsebroe* do determine, little considering that there was a necessity of it only then, when the Danes were Masters of both sides of the Strait. But because the Swedish Ambassadors made an Agreement

with the Danish Commissioners about these businessses, we think it more convenient to pass them by in silence.

But though it appears manifestly enough from those things we have laid down before, that the Danes suffered nothing to be wanting in them that might add any thing to the delaying the execution of the Peace; or, to speak more truly,

*Yet the
Danes
boldly
accuse the
Swedes, as
if they had
broken the
agreements.*

partly by denying their promises, partly by ambiguous interpretations, that they betrayed themselves to be in their hearts utterly against and averse to the observation of the Agreements; yet they took the boldness to lay the guilt of that crime to the Swedes, delighting much to make them, whom nature had given to be their neighbours, partakers of their crime. For when not long after the conclusion of the Peace, the Letters which the Danish Ministers sent to their King out of *Germany*, were intercepted and broke open in the Dukedom of *Sleswick*,

By the

*occasion of
some Letters
intercepted,
which were
directed to
the Danish
Court, and
printed.*

and part of them afterwards printed, without any regard that the most Serene the King of *Sweden* had by his Letters patents fully granted security and free passage every where to all publique Postes going and coming: then the Danes greedily catch'd at that occasion to make complaints, that the Swedes in this had grossly violated their Covenants.

But how irrational and groundless this was, will easily appear by the full Narrative of the Fact: For thus the case stands. There came one out of *Germany*, a Servant,

*Whereof a
particular
account is
given.*

as we found him to be afterwards, of some Danish Minister, who upon his petition had got a Pass at *Gottorp* from the most Serene the Duke of *Holftein*, this fellow was suspected by his Highness *Philip* Prince *Palatine*, General of the Swedish Horse, who had received intimation that there was one posting into *Denmark* with Letters from the King of *Hungary* and Electour of *Brandenburgh*, containing in them plots and contrivances destructive to the Kingdom of *Sweden*, and the more, in regard he would tell no body of what condition he was. Whereupon his forefaid Highness Prince *Palatine* gave command to an Officer, who was Governour of *Flensburgh* to stop him in his passage there, and to enquire of him, who he was, whence he came, and what he carried with him. For he had two Portmantles or Cloak-bags. There he betrayed his business by

(Pause)

making doubtful answers, and such as did not well hang together, and being ask'd what he carried in those Portmantles, he said that in one there was Letters, in the other things for him to wear. But because they gave no credit to what the fellow said, they look'd into one of them, in which he said there was no Letters, where they found, contrary to what he had said, instead of things to wear very many Letters, which afterwards being broken up at *Fuhnen* were sent to his Majesty of *Sweden* being then at *Gothenburgh*. His most Serene Majesty, without whose privacy and command all these things

were done, having lighted upon those Letters by chance, especially feeling they were written at that time,

*Shewing
how the
Auftrians,
Brandenbur-
gers and
Danes did
correspond
against the
Swede.*

when as yet there were great enmities betwixt these Northern Kingdoms, was pleased to cause some of them to be printed, that the world might see what the Auftrians and Brandenburg had in their hearts, and what he could promise himself of such an outside friendship, and pretences of security.

Besides this not long before, it was given out both by Letters and Messengers from *Denmark*, that the most Serene the King of *Sweden* had by reason the Forts were denied him in *Schonen*, gathered his Army together again, and prosecuted the War; so that from thence his Highness the Prince *Palatine*, who knew nothing of the composition but by reports, had cause sufficient to detain the man. All which matters of import being well considered with their circumstances, will very easily acquit the King of *Sweden* from the crime of violating the Peace, who only granted safe passage to publick Curriers, but not to any one that came out of suspected and enemies quarters, especially feeling he never professed himself to be a Currier of the King of *Denmarks*, or of any of the Danish Ministers, and had indeed got a Pass of the most Serene the Duke of *Holftein*, but no other, then in the common form that they use to have, who go journeys.

But there were not any contrivances of the Danes divulg'd,

*That the
Swedes did
not divulge
any Danish
contrivances
made after
the peace
concluded.*

which by the Peace lately made with the Swedes either were of no effect, or ought to be so, but of other enemies of *Sweden*, without any injury to the Nation of *Denmark*.

Much leffe did the Swedifh Ambaffadours urge any things

(Paper)

that were new,

*Nor did the
Swedifh Am-
baffadors
urge any
new thing,
or not
agreeing
with the
Treaty at
Roskild.*

or that did not well agree with the Treaties at *Roskild*, but fuch things indeed they did, as the Danes by their finifter interpretations gave them an occafion for, and which were thought to adde much weight to the better explaining of the Inftrument of Peace.

Which things upon that account his moft Serene Majefty of *Sweden* laid open in April to *Owen Juul*, Ambaffadour of the King of *Denmark*, at *Gothenburgh*, willing the fame to be done by his Deputies, Let. *DDD*.

Let. DDD.

to which purpofe he fent like commands to his Ambaffadours that refided at *Copenhagen*.

Unlefs they will call that new, which was treated on at *Copenhagen*, about the making reftitution of thofe fhips that were taken away in the time of the War from the Subjects of *Sweden*, in lieu of thofe that were feiz'd on in *Fuhnen*, and other Ports of *Denmark*. Sure that was for the advantage of the Danes, who for reftoring of one received ten. To fpeak nothing of a mutual covenant, by vertue of which that ought to have been fo performed.

Nor can that Article of Oblivion be accounted new,

*Nor could
the Article of
Oblivion be
accounted
new.*

which the Swedifh Ambaffadours would have inferted into an Additional Recefs, in regard the Danes themselves gave the occafion of doing it, by making the Swedes guilty of violating the Peace, unlefs they had had a

minde onely to lay afide the old War, and leave behinde them the feeds that might raife a new one.

Nor, laftly, is it any new thing,

*Nor that the
Swedes to
fecure them-
felves did
make
warlike
provisions of
Soldidiers.*

that the Swedes to free themselves from all kinde of fufpicion of the Danes, did get together Forreign Soldiers, and made other kinde of Warlike provision that might have been fpared, feeing without that they could not obtain the end of the War, which is the fecurity of the Kingdom of Sweden. The Danes themselves complained almoft every moment of the utter defolation of their Provinces, and that they were wholly unable to undergo the charge of the War: fure then it muft be fome very great reafon, that could perfwade them to lay a greater burthen of oppreffion upon thofe Subjects that were already utterly exhausted. And feeing there was no other Kingdom or Commonwealth except Sweden, againft which the Danes had fuch grudgings, as might break out into a War, it would be very hard for the Swedes to

[Pause]

promife themselves fecurity, whilst the other was in arms.

They were far more bitter yet, in upbraiding the Swedes for exceeding the limits of their Agreements,

*Nor that the
Subjects of
Denmark
were taxed
by the
Swedes
after the
pacification
otherwise
then juftly,
and ac-
cording to
Agreements.*

in that after the Pacification at *Roskild*, they did put the Subjects of the King

of Denmark to pay the same Taxes and Contributions, as in the heat of the War. But all that is founded upon a false Hypothesis, and hath its original from a misinterpretation of the 17th. Article of the Agreements at *Roskild*. For whereas that Article speaks of a necessary maintenance of the Swedish Army in the Dominions of the King of Denmark till the first day of May, the Danes putting a strange kind of sense upon those words, would have all ordinary Contributions, and what ever was commanded and promised before the conclusion of the Peace, either to redeem their Houses from firing, or to bring in Provision, to cease and be made void. Hereupon, presently after the Swedish Ambassadors came to Copenhagen, as we intimated before, the Danes rais'd a controversy about this business, complaining that all that was done, was directly contrary to the Agreements at Roskild. And *Owen Juul* was in the same note too at Gothenburgh,

Let. *EEE*.

Let. *EEE*. in April, the same month that the King of Denmark sent him.

But who, pray, is so ignorant in Military affairs, that knows not, that an Army hath not all kind of necessary maintenance, when they are supplied with meat and drink, but that there are more things requisite; as the furnishing them with money for Clothes, and Arms, and shoeing their Horses, and things of that nature. And because no King or Prince can maintain an Army in his own Kingdoms, Dominions, or Territories, with Victuals only, it is not probable that the King of *Sweden* would ease the Danes of that burthen, which in time of War is laid upon his own Subjects. Nor have the Danes deserv'd so well of the Swedes, as that they should respect them more than the faithful people and subjects of their own Countrey. It is well enough known, that after the late Peace made in Germany, the Soldiery had for almost two whole months, till the compleat execution of the Peace, not only a supply of Provision, but of Money too: which when the Swedish Commissioners alledged as an example in this business of Roskild, and

Christen

Christian Skiel the Danish Plenipotentiary (for *Gerfordff* high Steward of the Kingdome was sick at that time) did at first thwart it; asking what difference there was betwixt the times of Peace and War, if there were no ease of their burthens? to which when he received this answer, that there was this difference, That there was a time certain prefix'd for these Contributions, and that they were demanded without any hostility; at last he acquiesc'd and said, If they could get Peace upon no other terms, they must bear it patiently. And that this was really so, the Danes themselves, if they be honest men, cannot deny. The Swedish Ambassadors put the foresaid *Skiel* in minde of this at Copenhagen, and did themselves declare to *Flemming*, President of their

Military Affairs, that to be the explication of the 17th. Article. To which the Swedish Deputies answers to the demands of *Owen Juul* at Gothenburgh do every where agree.

But the cause of all the mistake in this business, was,

*Which is
proved by
the tenor of
the 17.
Article.*

because the Swedish Commissioners giving credit to what the Danes said, suffered this Article to be made up as well out of the Danish as the Swedish Project. Whence it came to pass, that those things which were before clearly and distinctly propounded, did now determine the business in some obscurity. For there are principally three heads of that Article, of which the first prescribes to the Soldierly, how they ought to behave themselves at their departure out of the Danish Provinces; the second, what they were to expect in Fuhnen, Jutland, Holstein, and other Countreys subject to the Kingdom of Denmark, till the first day of May; and lastly, how they must proceed in Sealand, to wit, where they should quarter, till the Sea were navigable. And as in their departure they were to commit no violence on the Subjects, so in Fuhnen, Laland, Jutland, Holstein, and other Territories of the Kingdom of Denmark, what ever was demanded, before the conclusion of the Peace, either of ordinary Contributions or to redeem their Houses from firing, or lastly to get their Provision together, ought, besides the maintenance of the Army, to be performed without any delay until the time of quitting them. But the case of Sealand was otherwise, which did grant the Soldiers nothing besides necessary

maintenance, as it should be defined by Commissioners of either party. And this is the genuine meaning of this Article. Truly it can scarcely be denied that it was by the negligence of some Commissioners of War in some places, that, in regard they thought they had much time left, they did not in due time demand of the Inhabitants of Fuhnen and Laland the contribution and moneys raised to prevent the firing of their Houses, and other such things as belong to their Provisions, according to the command they received from the most Serene the King of Denmark, before he went away into Sealand: But that negligence of theirs could not in such a case at all hinder the Swedes right when they fought it. Nevertheless his Sacred Royal Majesty of *Sweden* to make proof of his affection to the King of Denmark,

Yet the

*Swede did
remit some
thing of his
Right, to
ease the
Danes.*

at the instance of *Owen Juul*, remitted part of his right, and by publique Proclamation made at Gothenburgh, did most strictly command the abolition of all monthly Contributions for the future, the day of payment of which was not yet past.

As for the other infolencies committed by the Soldiery which the Danes complained of; as no one can do any more then prohibit them, so it is sufficient, if those that command them, inflict due punishment upon the Offenders.

The third violation of the Agreements,

*The third ac-
culation a-
gainst the
Swedes,
that they
went not out
of Denmark
about the
beginning of
May;
answered*

that they accuse the Swedes of, was, that the Swedish Army did not according to their Covenant, go out of the Danish Dominions about the beginning of May. But this is a strange kinde of impudence, to say nothing worse, to demand of his Majesty of Sweden that he should quit the Provinces in the Dominion of the Kingdom of Denmark, before they had performed those things, which are required to the execution of the Transaction at Roskild. For the acquitting of the Provinces is the last thing in point of time that ought to be executed, within which there should be nothing left undone that was to be done by either of the parties covenanting, but onely that which requires a permanent and continual Act. And, unless a plenary, and as to all things an absolute execution of the Peace was performed before, there was no necessity for the quitting of the Forts and Provinces afterwards. Nay, if his Sacred Royal Majesty of Sweden would

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have stood strictly upon his right, he was not bound to draw his Army out of

Sealand, in as much as the delivery of the thousand Horfe, according to the condition upon which he promised to quit it, was not yet performed. That one may justly say, that by this only action, the Swedes deserv'd very well of the Danes. Nor were they backward in shewing their readiness in other things, as appears in their quitting of Laland, the city Nasko, Falfre, Monen, and Langland, which were surrendered in their due time, and as soon as possibly they could; that any man might easily gather, that the Danes immediately after the Peace was made, did use all their endeavour to scrape up matter to make a new War on the Swedes.

Neither are we here led by vain suspicions,

*Evidences
that the
Danes did
not intend to
continue in
peace with
the Swedes
are set forth.*

or rumours of the unfable multitude; but by evident grounds and discoveries, such as to all impartial judges will make undeniable proof, that the Danes purposed nothing less than Peace.

For what could be in their end in charging his Majesty of *Sweden* with violating the Peace, in that he gave way that the moneys formerly leavied should be got in, for the necessary support of the soldiery, but only that by a notorious misconstruction of the Covenants, they might rake together some matter of a new War.

Or how could all that zeal and fervency to the ratifying of a perpetual confederacy with the Swedes, so suddenly have vanished, had it not been counterfeit and made to this very purpose, that by pretence of a League, they might discharge themselves of the third Article of the Treaty at *Roskild*, and that they might continue their League made with the States of *Holland* to the prejudice of the Swedes? Why should they have so abhor'd to join their Fleet of War with that of the Sweds, but that they might thereby get a fair way wholly to defeat the Agreements at *Roskild*, when they should be therefore accus'd of violating the Peace? Which Counsel was contriv'd by *Beuningen*, as he himself plainly took on him.

What made them appear so wayward and averse in the business of *Holstein*, complaining that heavier and heavier burthens were imposed on them, then had been promised, but that they might after a while take occasion to

evacuate all the Agreements?

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Why should they refuse to proceed to the promised division of the Ecclesiastical Goods of the Chapter of *Sleswick*, before the departure of the Swedish Army, although the Duke of *Holftein* himself urg'd it, had they had any purpose to stand to their conditions? Why should the King of *Denmarks* Counsellours in *Holftein*, who saw evidently enough (though they pretend to have been dubious) that a Peace was on foot betwixt the Swedes and Danes, suggest to their King such pestilent Counsel, together with such odious reproaches against the Swedes, but that they were assur'd they would be very grateful and acceptable?

Let. GGG.

Letter GGG. Why should they, being, as they themselves confess'd, in so necessitous a condition, go on to make new levies of souldiers? Or why did *Rofewing* by *Gerfidorffe's* warrant take care to secure *Copenhagen* with a Garrison of Dutch Souldiers, but that they were devising of a new War? Letter HHH. Why did they refuse to bring in the Horse they had promised,

Let. HHH.

pretending falsely they were not able, that they might be provided with sufficient force to deal with the Swedes? Why did *Owen Juul* affirm himself to the King of Swedes at *Gothenburgh*, that the business of *Holftein* was agreed, and *Gyldenlow* the Lieutenant General at *Flensburgh*, that the African or Guine Controversie was compounded, but that they might make him secure, and incite him to depart ere his business was dispatched? Why did the Danish Commissioners appointed for the Executive Treaties at *Copenhagen* never produce their Plenipotentiary Commissions? Why would they not bring a Register, if they intended really, and were willing their purpose should be understood? Why did they themselves retard the Treaties, if they were desirous to bring them to issue? Why was not that committed to writing, which was suppos'd to be agreed on on all hands, but that they never intended it should be binding to them? Why should they refuse on the morrow, what they had this day allowed, but that they would suspend the execution of the Peace, as the circumstances and change of time did either promise prosperity, or threaten adversity to the Swedes? What could be the reason they did not freely perform any one thing tending to the execution of the Peace, but that in time following they might have this to

[Page]

say, that all things were unjustly forc'd and extorted from them by compulsion and threats? It was not a talk of the vulgar, but a Maxime of the Peers of *Denmark*, that the Peace in hand betwixt the two Kingdoms could not be

durable, that they were not bound by a contract occasioned by force and fear; that those Provinces were not alien'd but lent, and must shortly be rendred back with interest; that other States and Re-publicks would not adventure to let the Swedes establish Monarchy in the North; that they would not want most powerful foes, whose united strength they would be unable to resist; that sometimes there was scarce a moment pass'd twixt great height and a down-fall; that the doubtful chance of War would afford opportunity of revenge when least look'd for, with other discourses of this kind, wherewith the Danes flattered themselves, and cherish'd those hopes of regaining their lost Provinces with many more into the bargain. And *Magnus Hoge* himself Senatour of the Kingdom of *Denmark*, may easily call to minde that he cast abroad the greatest part of these speeches.

But this eager desire of setting on the Swedes being so deeply rooted in the Danes, could not contain it selfe in words, breaking out so far, that before the Peace was yet come to ripeness, they endeavour'd by most villanous plots and attempts to bring speedy ruine on the King and Kingdom of *Sweden*. For whereas by the second Article of the Agreement at *Roskild*, the Danes were oblig'd, not onely, that all Leagues and Covenants formerly made with any to the prejudice of the Swedes should cease, if any such had been made, but also they should not by any means enter into any such for the future; they were so far from renouncing such Leagues, that the Leagues, which were at the conclusion of the Peace but shapely issues and imperfect embryo's, they have hitherto been licking into due form and perfection. Whereof the faithful communication of matters between the Hungarian and Polish Agents with the Danish Ministers at *Copenhagen*, may serve for abundant proof, if there were no other.

For what commerce could the King of *Hungary*, who was afterwards Emperour of *Germany*, have with the King of

Denmark or against whom could they finde occasion to contract Leagues, but against the Swedes, whose ruine they unanimously conspir'd, though in other respects they were very much divided. It was not for nothing the King of *Hungary* would have his Agent abide at *Copenhagen*, but the hopes, which the Danes had given of a League to be ratified and most solemnly kept, was that which detained him there.

The business of *Morstein* is like this, who was sent by the King of *Poland*, and stayes there to this day, being fed with the same hopes. Hereof *Beuning* gives testimony in his Letters, Let.

III. where he affirms that *Morfein* said, that he staid at *Copenhagen*, waiting upon the issue of the Diet of *Warfau*, and if a Peace were there concluded with the Muscovite, that he should make some farther stay in *Denmark*, but if otherwise, he should depart. Which, without question, he spoke to this end, that he might evidence by his words and affirmation, how constant the King would be found to the League with the Dane against the Swedes, if not hindered by War with the Muscovite.

But the Transaction with the Elector of *Brandenburgh* was carried more secretly, as if the Danes themselves had been ashamed to own their own malice; and it is certain that *Berlin*, the Minister sent by the King of *Denmark*, like one that durst not shew his head, met the Elector by night, and declar'd to him the things he had in charge. Of which the scope was, that the King solicited the Elector to take up Arms against the Swedes, that they might be forc'd to quit *Fuhnen*, *Jutland*, and other Provinces of *Denmark*, and to leave room for the Danes to begin a new War.

As to the united Provinces, *Gerfidorffe* high Steward of the Kingdom made a solemn promise immediately after the League was concluded, to their Ambassadors then Resident at the Danish Court, that whatsoever they in their freights and extremities had promised, his King would never endure that any thing should be perform'd, that was prejudicial to the League between the Kingdom of *Denmark*, and the said United Provinces, but rather he would preserve inviolate all things that had been agreed on betwixt them. This *Beuningen* recounted

in his Letters to the States, and in many other Letters of his, he hath with great pains published that inclination of the Danes to adhere to their League with them, and likewise how nothing at all was kept secret from him, that pass'd between the Swedish and Danish Commissioners in reference to the establishing of a League, and that the King himself did not dislike that they should be secretly imparted to him.

But what could the States alledge to be concluded to their prejudice (as they perversely and without reason expound it) more than that main Article of the Treaty at Roskild, to wit, of prohibiting any Fleets of War to enter the Baltick Sea without the consent of both the Kings. And this is the very Article, to the performance whereof, the Danes would not be oblig'd, though they had promised it.

Should we further relate with what bent and eagerness they they have been contriving to slander the Swedes to other Nations, and especially to the most Serene His Highness the Lord Protector of great Brittain, and to convict

them of breach of peace in requiring the Island of Ween, it would be an endless work. Thus indeed do the Danes heap blessings on the Swedes, promoting their good, and by all means diverting from them what might tend to their disadvantage!

And lest Sweden should want enemies, so great is their affection to their reconciled friends, the King of Denmark hath recommended several Officers, by himself dismissed, to the German Emperour and the Elector, who were then in open War against the Swedes.

Now who can be so utterly void of judgement, as to cast any blame on his most Serene Majesty of Sweden, in that he had regard to his own security, when the Peace agreed proved so unstable; nor would depart with his Army, ere he had, what in him lay, clean weeded out these ancient seeds of discord in these Northern Kingdoms. Which had been in great part effected, if the Executive Treaties had been concluded with a General Act of Oblivion of what ever was past. But the Danish Commissioners could never be brought to put any such thing in writing, it being easily discernable what they aimed at by their bankings and delays

Since therefore the Danes have in effect violated every Article of the Treaty at *Roskild*,

*The conclusion
recapitulatory of the
cause of
continuing
the War*

as is clearly to be collected from what hath been alledged; namely the first, in plotting sudden destruction to the Kingdome of *Sweden* by most pernicious counsells, expressing all good meaning to, and as much as in them lay, afflicting the implacable enemies of *Sweden*, studying to enrage both their friends and foes against them: the second likewise, in that they were so far from quitting their Leagues, formerly made to the Swedes prejudice, that they have made new ones to the like tendency: The third, In that they would not exclude a Foreign Fleet of War from the Baltick Sea: The fourth, In exacting Customs and other Charges from the Swedish Ships in the Sound: The fifth, by complaining that the Isle of *Ween* belonging to *Schonen* was wrongfully wrested from them, contrary to right and justice; nor to this day have they fully delivered it up as they ought to do: The sixth, In detaining certain Goods belonging to the Jurisdiction and Chapter of *Trundheim*. The eighth, In drawing very many of the Nobility in the Provinces yielded to the Swedes from observing their Oath. The eleventh, in not restoring three Swedish ships with their Cargo's, as also other things taken from the Swede before the War was proclaimed, and in refusing to satisfy the great depredations made by *Carloffe* in *Guine*, and likewise the Goods taken from Count *Konigsmark* and others, by violence, although the very persons that did it were well enough known. The fourteenth, In prohibiting the carrying away the warlike provision that was laid in store in *Anholm*, a Jurisdiction in *Laland*. The sixteenth, In not completing that promised supply of 2000. Horse, nor quitting *Bremer Vorden* at the time limited. The seventeenth, By endeavouring byundry disputes and contestations to bereave the Souldiery of their due maintenance, and so to make the Swedes guilty of breach of faith. The nineteenth, In not releasing the persons by the time prefix'd. And lastly, in as much as they have in no wayes performed the private Article. His most Serene Majesty was forc'd to betake himself again to his Arms, and since the Peace he had till then made, could scarce be term'd a Peace, the conditions and grounds thereof being

very little observed, to continue the War he had begun, till the Senators of *Denmark* should return to fairer carriage and proceedings.

For which reason also it was needful solemnly to denounce War, since the Danes knew right well what Peace-breakers were to expect; and that War must of necessity return, where the Peace solemnly made, through the Danes perverseness could take no effect. Notwithstanding the Swedish Ambassadors were cautious enough that the matter should not break out contrary to their just hope and expectation, not only affirming openly to the Danish Ministers, and especially to *Gerfordorff* high Steward of the Kingdom, that their Royal Majesty would never pass by their delays & elusions of Articles, but also signified by Letters written to the French Ambassador to that effect,

Let. KKK.

Let. KKK. that it was now altogether necessary to require from the Danes an absolute and positive answer whether they meant to perform their Covenants, and to determine the Executive Treaties or no. Yea, to make it the more evident, that they meant it in earnest, they shew'd the Kings Letters to the French Ambassador, wherein it was said expressly, that his Majesty was resolv'd not to depart out of *Denmark* with his Army, till the business were fully concluded; and that if *Prussia* were lost in the mean while, he would require reparation of the Danes. All which things were faithfully related by him, as the Letters of *Beuning* do sufficiently testify.

Surely it may hence be collected, how unwillingly his Majesty of *Sweden* descended to those extreme remedies, that he never omitted any thing which might in any sort conduce to demonstrate his readiness and affection to a serious maintaining of an entire Peace between these two Northern Kingdoms.

*Evidences
of the King
of Swedens
bounty to
oblige the
Danes to
him to
confirm the
Peace.*

For to say nothing of other expressions of his good affection, this must certainly proceed from a mind sincerely studious of Peace, that he freely granted to the Queen of *Denmark* the Jurisdiction of *Hirholme*, which by

vertue of the conditions should have been reftored to Count *Ulfeld*, undertaking to fatisfie *Ulfeld* the like in value: that he bestowed on *Ulrick Frederick*, the Kings Bastard-son, the command of two Regiments, and a considerable Pension for his life; and that he suffered

the Queen to enjoy the Rents of *Ween* during her life, they having been hers before.

Indeed his Majesty of *Denmark* had not onely laid aside all rankor of spirit, but also all desire of ruling over his neighbours, which creep on men of generous mindes sometimes against their wills, being contented with what he was perswaded might be sufficient for his security. And that he might for ever bar all pretence to *Denmark*, he thought fit to assume the Title of *Schonen*, aiming at nothing more, then that the Executive Treaties might speedily be brought to a good issue. Hence, as soon as he saw some hopes of it, he traitly enjoynd his Ambassadors then residing at *Copenhagen*,

*Irem, his
Majesties
performances of
conditions
on his part.*

to effect the Treaties, and Count *Wrangel* high Admiral that commanded in *Fuhnen* and *Jutland*, for the gaining of time to march his Army forthwith without the least delay out of *Denmark*, as soon as he should be certified by the Ambassadors from *Copenhagen*, that the Treaty was concluded. His Majesty with his Queen departed from *Gothenburgh*, intending for *Holftein*, with certain confidence, that he should finde his Army on their March.

And indeed his Majesty wondred much at the preposterous counsells of the Danes, that they delayed to put a final period to the Treaties, little regarding that their Subjects sustained great damage, whilst the Army abode in their Countreys. Notwithstanding, suspecting nothing, he commanded part of his Forces away, at *Flensburgh* he gave the same Orders both to his Ambassadors at *Copenhagen*, and also to Count *Wrangel*, and the rather for that it was told him by *Gyldenlow* that the Commissioners were not onely in a manner agreed concerning the satisfaction of the African Company,

*Whereas the
Danes did
nothing but
dilatorily.*

but alfo that the Horfe remaining were to be delivered prefently up with the Caftle of *Bremer Vorden*.

But if it had been his Majefties pleafure to have affaulted the Danes afrefh, he would, as confulting with the prefent ftate of Affairs, have remitted fomething of his Right in the caufe of the Brandeburgh, and would not have had fo urg'd the Danes to furnifh out their Fleet, unlefs a man fhould believe that the King of Sweden purpos'd to provide weapons for his enemies.

But when he saw most certainly, that the Danes in their procraftinations had quite another drift than the tranquillity of the North, and that to spend time, and to delay under some colourable pretence the conference with his Ambassadors, and that *Owen Juul* was sent in Embassy about no other business, then what the Ambassadors at *Copenhagen* were fully instructed in; being taught by infallible arguments that his moderation and gentleness had been of little or no avail with the Danes, and that his courtesies had only encouraged them to the more foul ingratitude and desperate madness. For the Danes had persuaded themselves, that he could not, though he should never so much desire it, make any stay in *Denmark*, especially since they understood, while these matters had depended, that the King of Hungary and Bohemia, a deadly enemy of the Swedes, was elected Emperor of Germany, that the Brandenburg Ambassadors were gone in dislike from Flensburg without taking leave of the King, and that the City of Thorun was traitly besieged.

His most Serene Majesty of *Sweden* therefore was not stirr'd up against the Danes by any blind desire of embroiling himself in War,

*Evidences
of the
Swedish
intention,
that it was
not to assault
the Danes, if
he had not
been by
them neces-
sitated to it.*

since being assail'd on all hands by so many powerful enemies, he could not possibly want occasion to exercise his Military prowess. Nay, he was rather constrain'd by inevitable necessity to work himself out of those tempests, the Danish plots had rais'd against him. Truly, he had not forgotten what great mischief the Muscovite had done in *Leifland*, and how little credit was to be given to them, though they talk'd so much of Peace. The hazardous estate of the Protestants in *Poland* too, with the cries of his own Subjects in *Prussia*, imploring his aid almost every moment, did deeply affect his otherwise most calm and gentle spirit. The horrible injuries done him by the Austrians, did irritate his generous resolution, which injuries as he never provok'd or drew on himself, so undoubtedly he had then resolved to take vengeance of them, he pondered in his mind the *Brandenburgs* treacherous plots and

breaches of League, which would easily have mov'd any to just indignation, especially since it was of so high concern to the Protestant Cause in general, suddenly to withdraw him from the pernicious

[Page]

Society of the House of *Austria*.

But the consideration of these and other things was overpowered by the truly royal affection he bore to his Kingdom and people, which would by no means permit, that by chastising the injuries of others, he should again expose his Country to the robberies and outrages of the Danes, chiefly since by those unlucky delays many fair opportunities were already elapsed, that his enemies by degrees had gotten strength, and those who formerly were hardly able to make any defence, were now so bold as to invade and make a new War upon him; and lastly that those, who had purposed to be at Peace, were now grown furious, and threaten'd his utter destruction.

To which may be added, that however his Majesty might be able to sustain the Wars brought on him by others, yet he foresaw great difficulty in avoiding the Armies of the Danes, and the performance of what they had contriv'd at *Gluckstad*, especially being environed by so great a multitude of enemies.

Therefore he held it most necessary, since he could not hinder, yet to avoid and frustrate these Danish designs against *Sweden*, and so far as there was no safety but in Arms, he deem'd it not unfit to exchange a War for a faithless Peace, having resolv'd, if God should prosper his undertakings, (of which the justice of his cause forbids him to doubt) never to desist till he should see a faithful, sincere, and durable Peace restored and settled betwixt these Northern Kingdoms.

And though his Sacred Royal Majesty of *Sweden* had entertain'd quite another opinion of the King of *Denmark*, he could not possibly be induced, to think that a Prince formerly commended for his affection to Peace, and who had fought to express the same in several debates and overtures, should now assume a contrary temper; yet could he not, though it was his earnest desire, refrain from War, which was the only imaginable remedy to preserve himself against the treacheries of the Danes. Nor is the King himself to be excus'd, for he must justly be presum'd to have liked and approved what his Ministers did, since through his unreasonable facility, he restrain'd it not, as by his authority he might and ought.

But as for the effusion of Christian blood, without which this

[Page]

business cannot be effected,

*And
therefore is
guiltless of
the effusion
of Christian
Blood.*

as his Majesty of Sweden doth most heartily detest and lament the same; for he makes no doubt, but that the eternal Justice, which is only incorrupt, will in its own time avenge the same on the contrivers of the Danish devices.

Lastly, touching the desolation of the Provinces,

*And of the
desolation of
Provinces.*

and the great calamity brought on the Subjects, let the Danes impute those things to themselves, who having first provok'd us to Arms, sued for Peace, when they saw no remedy but they must be beaten; to no other end, then that in the mean time they might desire aid from others, and disable the Swedes forces by dividing and drawing them into diverse parts at once.

The success of which Counsels, their posterity, those that shall be left of them, may deplore, when it is too late, not without horrid execrations on their Ancestors; in that they preferred a doubtful War, and such as would draw nothing after it but ruine, before a sincere and a secure Peace.

FINIS.

[Page]

A REMONSTRANCE OF HIS Sacred Royal Majefty OF SWEDEN,
Unfolding the GROUNDS and CAUSES whereby His said Majefty was
constrained to continue the WAR brought on him by the King and Kingdom
of DENMARK, After the PEACE was ratified at *Roskild*, But neither Purfu'd
nor duly Obferv'd by the DANES. Anno 1658.

LONDON, Printed by *R. Wood* for *D. Pakeman*, and are to be fold at his
Shop at the Sign of the Rain-bow in *Fleet-ftreet*, 1659.

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Note, The Publick Acts and Records before mentioned, and often cited in the Margin, according to the Letters of the Alphabet, being not ready for the Prefs, fhall follow with the firft opportunity.

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